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ESTRANGEMENT AND RECONCILIATION IN MODERN THOUGHT*

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MODERN MAN wants to be reconciled with himself, with humanity, with life as a whole. Modern man has a profound feeling of estrangement as self-alienation from his genuine and true being, of enmity within himself and within his world, of separation from the ultimate source of being and meaning. Driven by the pain of such self-estrangement, he asks the question of reconciliation, sometimes using this very word, sometimes using a solution for the problem a quite secular terminology. In either case, a keen observer may discover traits in the self-interpretation of modern man which are of utmost interest for an apologetic—and hence for a reconciling theology.

In traditional theology "Reconciliation" belongs to a group of concepts which for two thousand years have successfully resisted all attempts at precise definition and systematic ordering. Salvation and regeneration, redemption and atonement, justification and sanctification belong to this group; and so does reconciliation. Each points to *one* total act by means of a different symbolic material and with a different emphasis. The total act is the re-establishment of an original but disrupted unity: Salvation, i.e., making whole and healthy; redemption, i.e., buying back; atonement, i.e., (perhaps) bringing at one; reconciliation, i.e., bringing together, all express literally such an act. The special character of "reconciliation" is given by the sphere of personal relations from which it is taken. This origin is always noticeable whenever the word is used, although in many cases it designates the reunion of a personal or personified being with an object or a state of things and not with another person.

I do not intend to go into the history of the theological idea of reconciliation, but I mean to give some important examples of the way in which the modern mind has expressed its need *for* and its faith *in* reconciliation. The phrases "modern mind" and "modern thought" are vague enough to embrace such different but representative teachers of estrangement and reconciliation as the early Hegel, Marx in his philo-

* Presidential Address for the American Theological Society, April 14th, 1944.

sophical period, William James, and C. G. Jung. The uniting element in these and many related thinkers, to some of whom I shall refer, is their intuitive understanding of the profound complex of modern man, and their philosophical or scientific attempts to show the point at which the conflicting moments are reconciled essentially and may also be reconciled actually. Moreover, they are chosen because each of them applies the ideas of estrangement and reconciliation to a special sphere, Hegel to life as a whole, James to the idea of truth, Marx to our social, and Jung to our personal existence.

In a brief conclusion the question will be raised how the Christian idea of reconciliation is theoretically and should be practically related to these—formally secular, but materially religious—ideas of estrangement and reconciliation.

I

ESTRANGEMENT AND SELF-ALIENATION

Estrangement, in contrast to reconciliation, describes the disruption of an essential unity and consequently a destructive situation. The estrangement of casual friends from each other or of a man from a casual interest has no catastrophical character. But if subject and object of the estrangement are identical, an intolerable situation arises; estrangement then become self-alienation. The threat of losing oneself and the pain of contradicting oneself result from such an immanent estrangement, and a quest for reconciliation is the necessary consequence of it. Self-estrangement can arise within a we-self as well as within an ego-self; it can occur within the unity of life as a whole, and in the unity of the divine ground of life; it can occur in the communion of the knowing and the known, as well as of the loving and the loved. In each of these cases self-estrangement is the absolute threat, and reconciliation the absolute demand, for a living unity.

The correlation of self-estrangement and reconciliation has important implications for the theological idea of reconciliation and its philosophical understanding. If that estrangement which demands reconciliation has the character of self-estrangement, the separation of man from God must have the character of a self-estrangement on the side of man and—as far as we can say this symbolically—also on the side of God. Man is estranged from himself if he is estranged from

God, and God is estranged from himself if he is estranged from man. If God were the most powerful and most perfect being, but only alongside me, then estrangement from this adorable companion would be regrettable, but not a matter of absolute concern with an absolute demand for reconciliation. Perhaps he could destroy me externally, but he could never destroy me internally—namely in the hell of despair—if the center of my being were not in the center of his being. And, on the other hand, if man were the being most similar to God and nearest to him, but not an eternal potentiality within the unity of the divine life, his estrangement from God would not be a divine self-estrangement demanding reconciliation. The symbol of the participation of God in the suffering of the self-estranged creature would be meaningless. The interpretation of the Cross as the manifestation of God's self-surrender for reconciliation of the world with himself would be human arrogance. The attempt of Protestant mysticism, from Boehme to Berdyayev and some American personalists, to express the participation of the divine life in the life of the world would be in vain.

Two main types of philosophy of religion are understandable from these considerations. For the one type, God is an alien to me, as I am a stranger to him, and both of us act as it is natural or decent to act towards a stranger. I approach him as one unknown who happens to come into my orbit. I make statements about him in terms of doubt and possibility and perhaps probability. I am at first suspicious, then friendly towards him, and may even become his friend. And he, as the more powerful and more perfect one, may give me support, direction, mercy; he may reveal himself to me within the limits of our remaining alienation. But all this is accidental for both of us. It might happen or it might not. In the other type of philosophy of religion, man meets himself and not a stranger. But in himself he meets something which is more himself than *he* is and which, at the same time, infinitely transcends himself. What he meets is, so to speak, the *prius* of himself, and consequently, it is present even in the most radical self-estrangement and enmity against oneself and God. That basic certainty cannot be lost. Such is the difference between a religious philosophy of the stranger and a religious philosophy of self-estrangement. Self-estrangement as a reality is a heritage in all cultures. Self-estrangement as an experience is both curse and grace at the same time. Christianity has a profound—the profoundest—feeling of self-estrangement among the

great religions. But it has—in contrast to the Indian religions—faith in a reconciliation which is not self-negation. There is, on the other hand, little feeling of self-estrangement in the social rationalism of bureaucratic China, or in the technical rationalism of bourgeois Europe. But since Europe had a Christian background, the Enlightenment's belief in harmony did not last very long. Hegel stands at its boundary line; by introducing the principle of negativity in all movement, he acknowledges the self-estrangement of everything that exists. But by subjecting this principle to the demands of a complete and harmonious system, he maintains the Enlightenment's belief in a world which is actually reconciled. The bourgeois conservatism which suppressed his early revolutionary tendencies made him betray his own insight into the estranged state of existence in general, and of bourgeois existence in particular. Nevertheless, in his dialectical understanding of self-alienation, the spirit of Christianity was so strong that it turned against himself in the thought of his pupils and initiated the anti-bourgeois revolution in which we are living.

II

ESTRANGEMENT AND RECONCILIATION IN LIFE UNIVERSAL: THE EARLY HEGEL

Early papers of Hegel's, published for the first time in 1907 and not yet translated into English, belong to the most fascinating documents in the history of European thought. They show Hegel as a *Lebensphilosoph*. The principle of Hegel's philosophy is here from the very beginning "life estranged and reconciled." The doors of life for him personally were religion and politics. Political absolutism and religious transcendentalism were the great expressions of that self-estranged life against which he was fighting. In the Greek city-state he saw the symbols of reconciliation, namely, political democracy and religious immanentism.

Religious transcendentalism is described in his extraordinary pages about Abraham (Nohl, 245 pages). For Hegel, Judaism is a symbol of estrangement. Abraham is separated from his family, from his national religion, and from community with other nations. He is migrating without a home in soil, space, or nature. His nomadic existence cor-

responds to his inability to love. He replaces the happiness of being by the unhappy subjection to what ought to be. Opposition replaces union, control replaces *eros,* law replaces communion. Abraham represents unreconciled religious transcendence.

In another paper, concerning Christianity in the Roman empire, he speaks of the total depravity of human life in this period, which produced an absolute devaluation of man's nature and a transference of all values to a transcendent God. Man, self-estranged, projects everything which is good in him into a strange absolute being which is no longer *his* absolute being, as Hegel says.

In the God of the doctrine of double predestination an eternal estrangement between God and the greater part of mankind is established which no reconciling love overcomes, for it is not a divine self-estrangement, demanding reconciliation. The creature has no eternal standing in the divine life.

In philosophy, Kant continues the principle of estrangement in his absolute cleavages between form and matter, between duty and inclination, between freedom and necessity. Kant has liberated autonomous reason, but he has made a new law of it, as tyrannical as the religious law, and equally unreconciled with man's life.

Essays denouncing the political estrangement of government from the people accompany these religious studies. Ultimately both point to the same reality, the self-estrangement of life in modern bourgeois society, the separation of man from the life of nature by the control of nature, the separation of man from man in the system of competition, the separation of man from himself in his self-surrender to the demands of the prevailing social system. The symbols of the past which Hegel uses—the spirit of Judaism, the spirit of Calvinism, the spirit of Kantianism—anticipate most of the recent sociological and psychological insights into the spirit of modern society and the forms of its self-estrangement.

In the face of this situation the young Hegel writes his beautiful passages on the reconciliation of life through love. He describes how life duplicates itself in love creating the other and reuniting him with itself. Transition from original unity through self-estrangement to reconciliation is the way of love. The richness of life is based on the possibility of infinite contradictions and separations, but only if they are reconciled and do not destroy the original unity. Love in this sense con-

stitutes being. Being is synthesis, namely the synthesis of love. When we read today about Hegel's scheme of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and are repelled by the mechanical logic of its application, we should not forget that even in the later Hegel the original vision is still alive, that thesis means life, antithesis law, tyranny, estrangement, and synthesis, love, community, reconciliation.

In a very characteristic study, called "Reconciliation to fate through Love," he says (Nohl, p. 280), "The criminal believed that he dealt with an alien life. But he has destroyed his own life. For life is not different from life, because all life is within the one divinity. In his arrogance he *has* destroyed, but only the *friendliness* of life. He had turned it into an enemy." Life has become law for the criminal and as law it is irreconcilable. The fear of the law is the fear of something strange, excluding and condemning oneself. Reconciliation is possible only if the law is understood as my fate, as the reaction of my own life against my violation of it. "In his destiny man recognizes his own life, his turning to it is not a turning to a strange master, but it is returning —to oneself."[1] This, of course, does not mean that the consequences of the self-violation are extinguished. And we could not even want this. Facing our own fate we cannot beg for mercy. We must feel the enmity of our destiny in all its horror. We must take the pain of the estrangement from life upon ourselves. Only then is reconciliation real.

Hegel's later system is a continuous and universal interpretation of this essay about the reconciliation of life with itself. He changes his terminology; he replaces life by spirit. But spirit remains life, it is always dynamic and creative, always in a process of self-estrangement and reconciliation. The philosopher expresses it in conceptions, but the process is a continuous work in all realms of life. It has two sides. On the one hand, reconciliation must eternally be accomplished, for, as Hegel says, "If life is not reconciled in itself, it is irreconcilable altogether." The eternal unity of the ground of life is the basis of all actual self-estrangement and reconciliation. On the other hand, reconciliation is the temporal process of life. "Philosophy in this respect is theology; it describes the reconciliation of God with himself, in nature, the individual and in world history (*Werke* 12, p. 288). Referring to the doctrine of atonement, Hegel writes: "God is dead, says a Lutheran

1. German Edition, translated by the author.

hymn. This expresses the certainty that the human, finite, weak and negative is an element of the divine itself, that the negative is not outside God and does not prevent unity with God" (Hegel, *Werke* 12, p. 253).[2]

Applying theological criticism to Hegel's idea of reconciliation and to that of most of his conscious and unconscious followers, I would state: this is reconciliation without justification. The situation of the philosopher thus defined is the situation of the mystic who has elevated himself gradually to the throne of eternal reconciliation, from which he looks down at the harmony of a reconciled world. But this is not the human situation. For man, reconciliation is always a paradox, a matter of soaring between uncertainty and certainty, of venturing faith and unexpected grace. Estrangement as an existential state does not *imply* reconciliation. Reconciliation is, as Ritschl has expressed it, the result of the synthetic judgment of justification. No analysis of life can give it. With these words I have formulated the criticism Hegel has received from all existential thinkers, from the later Schelling and Kierkegaard down to present day Existentialism. But in spite of this criticism they have all accepted his vision of the self-estrangement of life, though detached in it from a premature system of reconciliation which stands in contrast with an unreconciled actual world.

III

ESTRANGEMENT AND RECONCILIATION IN KNOWLEDGE: JAMES

Hegel wrote: "Only through love is the power of the objective broken." "Object" is the cognitive expression of the self-estrangement of life. The literal sense of the word *ob-jectum* in German *Gegenstand*, points to the opposition of the object to the subject. There is a cleavage between them, involving an alienation from the original unity of all life. As long as this cognitive estrangement is not reconciled, there is no truth. Of course, life always objectifies in order to return to itself richer than before. But when the object becomes independent it resists reconciliation and prevents knowledge; for knowledge is the event in which subject and object are reconciled. Truth is a fruit of reconciliation. In the state of estrangement the subject is not able to recognize

2. German Edition, translated by the author.

the essential unity of itself and the object; it does not recognize itself in the object. Therefore it makes the object an aim of its desire; it does not listen to the demand of the object itself and, consequently, is driven from one object to the other in that empty infinity of desire which characterizes the modern man in his estrangement from nature and himself. Neither the estranged object nor the estranged subject of desire can enter the unity of truth. Without the reconciliation of subject and object no true knowledge is possible.

In order to understand the elevation and sometimes deification of experience in modern pragmatism we must realize this background of its ideas. William James says of his philosophy of experience that it "is only a more comminuted *Identitätsphilosophic* (*Essays in Radical Empiricism,* p. 197) and . . . if there is any such thing at all as knowing the knower and the object known must both be portions of experience (p. 196). This unity of subject and object is the only concept of the Absolute he accepts. The Absolute is a 'pure' experience on an enormous scale, undifferentiated and undifferentiable into thought and thing. This the post-Kantian idealists have always practically acknowledged by calling their doctrine an *Identitätsphilosophic*" (p. 134). Reality, in this sense, is always defined as a terminus within the general possibilities of experience, and that which knows it is defined as an experience that represents it. The opposition of subject and object is thus dissolved. Experience is the reconciling concept, less romantic in its sound than love, but not much different in substance, as another quotation shows. In rejecting Kantian idealism James says, "Oneness overcomes *moral* separateness. In the passion of love we have the mystic germ of what might mean a total union of all sentient life" (*Pragmatism,* p. 155). Over against the absolutistic philosophy in which an all-witnesser throws categories over things like a net, he praises the pragmatic attitude as a "mediator and reconciler." It excludes exclusiveness, it accepts sense data as well as logical principle, it is all-embracing. While these formulations sound very similar to those of Hegel, there is one clear difference. For James the actual reconciliation of life, the unity of experience, lies in the future. He likes to speak of the Ultimate instead of the Absolute. In the present world there is a discontinuity and unreconciled separation; there are fragments the unity of which is beyond experience. Reconciliation is a matter of expectation, and of action on the basis of such expectation. Truth as the whole of experi-

ence is an anticipation. But it is a justified anticipation, for, in spite of the pluralistic structure of reality, the unity of possible experience is always presupposed. Pluralism, if it is not to fall into metaphysical neurosis, cannot deny this element of monism.

Such a fall is the last thing pragmatism would like, because its criteria of truth are health and growth. It is easy to criticize them and to ask what is the standard of health, and which growth is good and which is evil? But perhaps we can understand the meaning of these criteria also in the light of the idea of reconciliation. Salvation means healing, making healthy; but health in body, soul, and society means balanced unity of divergent trends. And if such a unity has been lost by self-estrangement, salvation must first of all be reconciliation. Truth is what reconciles, and reconciles not only in terms of restitution but in terms of creative reunion or growth. In this sense, also, the mystical anticipation of a complete reconciliation between oneself and the world has truth, if it actually works such reconciliation. The criterion of a religious idea is its reconciling power, either in terms of a "moral holiday," as James has called it, in which life is felt as eternally reconciled, or in terms of the moral workday, in which the actual reconciliation is expected and sought day by day. I may add a word from John Dewey, in whose school scientific empiricism tends to overwhelm the pragmatistic intuition of life. He himself says, perhaps in unconscious remembrance of his Hegelian past, "The value of experience for the philosopher is that it serves as a constant reminder of something which is neither exclusive and isolated subject or object, matter or mind, nor yet one plus the other. The fact of integration in life is a basic fact." (*Experience and Nature,* p. 39.) Furthermore, "There is a composing and harmonizing of the various elements of our being. . . . This attitude includes a note of submission. But it is voluntary, not externally imposed. . . . It is a change of will—rather than any special change *in* will." (*A Common Faith,* pp. 16-17.)

Theological criticism of the pragmatic idea of reconciliation in experience must point to the small emphasis given therein to the idea of estrangement, and to the lack of a description of *self*-estrangement. The reason for this is its pluralistic ontology, which has the consequence that estrangement is taken less seriously than by many other modern thinkers, and that the tragic element in Hegel's philosophy of life, and especially in his philosophy of history, is lost. The rationally

acting pragmatist feels himself reconciled, not in a universal sense, but in every moment of productive activity. Often he feels more as a reconciler than as somebody who is in need of reconciliation. He has little use for the symbol of the Cross, but much use for the Kingdom of God growing on earth. But in spite of all this, like Hegel, he has recognized that truth presupposes reconciliation and that experience is reconciled reality and knowledge at the same time.

IV

ESTRANGEMENT AND RECONCILIATION IN SOCIETY: THE EARLY MARX

As Hegel's early theological papers reveal more about his basic intuitions than do his later writings, so Marx's early philosophical fragments reveal his basic impulses. In him the experience of estrangement reached explosive power, and the demand for reconciliation reached revolutionary strength. His use of the term estrangement, supported by words like dehumanization, is mainly responsible for its importance in contemporary thought. Religion, according to Marx, is the sacred form of man's self-estrangement. But this sacred form is only a projection of the secular forms of his self-estrangement; religion is an expression of man who is not actually what he is essentially, what he ought to be. It is the *phantastic* realization of man's true nature, because man's true nature has no *actual* realization. And indeed it *has* not: Man is a socially acting and producing being, but his present social reality is characterized by a complete loss of humanity. The principle of our industrial society is immanent struggle. The capitalistic form of private property is the perfect expression of man's self-estrangement. Through the power of money it transforms love into hate, hate into love, virtue into vice, vice into virtue, the servant into the master, the master into the servant.[1] All relations between man and man, also between man and nature, become relations in terms of commodities. Man himself becomes a commodity, a quantity of labor power, to be bought and sold. Everything becomes an object, that is an object of control and desire, but not "the portion of experience," or an element in the unity of love. The identity of self-estrangement, objectivation, and absolute private property as already suggested in one of Hegel's early papers, is the point of departure for Marx's criticism of bourgeois society.

In this society, reconciliation is demanded most effectively where estrangement and dehumanization are manifest without veil or ideological coverings—in the proletariat. Although the ruling classes participate in the general estrangement, they can hide it by their economic power and cultural means. The disinherited classes can not. And, therefore, they are the possible reconcilers of an estranged mankind. They are not better than others, but in them humanity as idea and passionate interests are united by historical providence. They fight for a *real humanism,* in which, not only in theory and for the philosopher, but in practice and for everybody, life is reconciled with itself. The hope for this victory over self-estrangement, the faith in this reconciliation and the fight for it, have reconciled the masses within industrial society and re-established their humanity. In this way the social revolution has become one of the great symbols of reconciliation in modern thought.

A transition to the problem of estrangement and reconciliation in personality may be made by a quotation from a contemporary thinker who unites, as frequently happens today depth-psychological with depth-sociological insights in their interdependence. Erich Fromm, in *Escape from Freedom,* says:

> Man has built his world. . . . But he has become estranged from the product of his own hands, he is not really the master any more of the world he has built. . . . He keeps up the illusion of being the center of the world, and yet is pervaded by an intense sense of insignificance and powerlessness (pp. 117-18). Not only the economic, but also the personal relations between men have this character of alienation; . . . they assume the character of relations between things. But perhaps the most important and the most devastating instance of this spirit of instrumentality and alienation is the individual's relationship to his own self. Man does not only sell commodities, he sells himself and feels himself to be a commodity" (p. 119).

A few words in theological criticism of this idea of reconciliation may suffice. The assumption of Marx that the point of complete dehumanization is the turning-point towards reconciliation cannot be verified, either empirically or rationally. Marx himself speaks of vanguards in the proletarian movement, but these vanguards must possess a special power which contradicts the dogma of complete dehumanization. Only the human in man can react contrary to the unhuman. Those who fight successfully for reconciliation against estrangement must have experienced reconciliation within their estranged situation, as had the

Jewish prophets and the revolutionary movements in Christianity. With respect to the Marxian idea of reconciliation, Christian theology must endorse Hegel's statement that life cannot be reconciled if it is not reconciled within itself. This insight created the Religious Socialist movement.

V

ESTRANGEMENT AND RECONCILIATION IN PERSONALITY: JUNG

Psychotherapeutic psychology is a result of radical experience. It is not a metaphysical system or a doctrine of man. It is a method of dealing with self-estranged personality; it is a way to the reconciliation of such personality with itself. It is a half medical, half priestly help, given to self-estranged individuals to liberate them from the mechanisms of self-hate and self-destruction, and to guide them towards genuine self-love and creative freedom in their relation to the world.

C. G. Jung, in a book with the characteristic title, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul,* describes the neurotic self-estrangement of personality in these words: "Neurosis is an inner cleavage—the state of being at war with oneself. . . . What drives people to war with themselves is the intuition or the knowledge that they consist of two persons in opposition to one another. . . . A neurosis is a dissociation of personality" (p. 273). Modern man wants to learn "how he is to reconcile himself with his own nature—how he is to love the enemy in his own heart and call the wolf his brother" (p. 274). Most of the ideas mentioned before are contained in this sentence. In Karl Menninger's book, with the equally characteristic title, *Man against Himself,* we read: "Try as we may, it is difficult to conceive of our universe in terms of concord, instead we are faced everywhere with the evidences of conflict. Love and hate, creation and destruction—would appear to be the dynamic heart of the world" (p. 3). This refers also to the inner life of the self. Patients often do not *want* to be healed. They destroy themselves in many ways of which suicide is only one. The death-instinct, the discovery of which is one of Freud's most important contributions to the idea of self-estrangement, often becomes stronger than the life instinct. Destructiveness conquers creativeness. The self-estranged self is split into two or more selves which, however, remain within the one self. For this situation the word self-hate can be used, by analogy (although not

strictly). The same is true of the reconciled stage which can be called—analogously—self-love. Hostility against oneself expresses itself, according to Fromm, in "Selfishness and Selflove,"[3] in the following way: "People are their own slavedrivers instead of being the slaves of a master outside themselves, they have put the master within. This master is harsh and cruel." Conscience, as developed since the Reformation, especially in Calvinism, and later in Kantianism, plays a great role in this hostility of modern man against himself. It turns "the basic destructiveness, inherent in man against him in terms of duty and moral obligation." Selfishness in distinction to self-love is an expression of our dislike for ourselves. It is infinite greediness which never comes to satisfaction because we are insecure about ourselves, not loving ourselves with the love which is reconciliation. While enmity against oneself creates enmity against everybody else, love of oneself creates love of other ones.

Self-estrangement implies the loss of freedom. Man cannot stand his freedom and

> tries frantically to get rid of it and to subject himself to any kind of authority. He does not dare to live his own life, and surrenders it to those who want such surrender, a loveless moral God or a loveless moralistic society. But unlived life is the source of all destructiveness. Destructiveness against oneself and against others is the revenge of suppressed freedom. Ultimately the Self, unable to express itself freely, loses its identity, takes on a pseudo-self and becomes an adjusted automaton, saying "I am as you desire me." Since . . . he cannot experience life in terms of spontaneous activity he takes as surrogate any kind of excitement and thrill (Fromm, *Escape from Freedom,* p. 255).

How can the self-estranged personality be reconciled, how can he regain his freedom? Jung, in his chapter, "Psychotherapists or the Clergy" (in *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*), answers that it is impossible to heal anybody else without accepting him entirely. "Yet the patient does not feel himself accepted unless the very worst in him is accepted too" (p. 270). Condemnation, even if not outspoken would estrange him. But we can accept the other one at his worst only if we accept ourselves at our worst. We must acknowledge the reality of our own neurosis, our unreconciled stage, and not try to rob ourselves of it. If we accept ourselves in such a radical way, rejecting whatever is re-

3. *Psychiatry: Journal of the Biology and Pathology of Interpersonal Relations.* Vol. II, No. 4 (November, 1939), p. 517.

quested of us from outside and not from inside, we shall observe a fundamental law of life, the reversal into the opposite, the reunion of the warring halves of the personality and the end of the civil war within us (p. 275).

"Spontaneous activity is the one way in which man can overcome the terror of aloneness without sacrificing the integrity of his self; for in the spontaneous realization of the self man unites himself anew with the world—with man, nature, and himself. Love is the foremost component of such spontaneity . . . work is the other component (Fromm, pp. 260 f.).

This is the idea of reconciliation in modern thought, and it is surprisingly consistent in all the representatives we have mentioned.

Theological criticism of the doctrine of reconciliation through creative freedom must ask the question: What is the content of this freedom, what is the direction of this creativity? Is freedom only freedom *from* something? And if not, *for* what *is* freedom? *Is* reconciled creativity, without criteria and if not, where is there a definite criterion which does not establish a new law?

VI

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND IDEAS OF ESTRANGEMENT AND RECONCILIATION

In all the ideas of reconciliation in modern thought some fundamental Christian ideas are presupposed. In all of them the essential unity of life is consciously or unconsciously assumed, even in pragmatic pluralism. Without this assumption of essential unity—a consequence of the Hebrew-Christian belief in creation—no conception of reconciliation is possible. In all of the conceptions the Hebrew-Christian valuation of history is accepted. Estrangement happens in history, in personality, and in society. Time is not only an expression of estrangement from eternity, but it is also the place where the new appears and reconciliation is actual. In all these conceptions a hidden Christology can be discovered, namely, the idea of reconciliation by some participating suffering which takes the estrangement of life, or society or personality upon itself. In all of them is visible a genuinely Christian fight against every kind of law as absolute and an acceptance of the power of grace in life, nature, and man. In all of them the idea of estrangement is not a matter of conscious decision, but it is a state of things which, as in

the Christian doctrine of the Fall, precedes all personal decisions. In all of them love is the reality of reconciliation. It is the dissolution of estranged objectivity, of strangeness and enmity against others and against oneself. It is, in all cases, the kind of love which elevates both the loving and the loved, the knowing and the known, beyond themselves. It is the *agape* type of love.

The modern ideas of estrangement and reconciliation, therefore, must be considered as autonomous developments of fundamental Christian principles. From this there follows the basic attitude that Christian theology should take towards these ideas. First of all, it should acknowledge them as bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh, as self-estranged theology, estranged by that mixture of grace and guilt on *both* sides which characterizes life universal, bound for reconciliation and not for mutual destruction. Christian theology must not appear as an intellectual, moral, or emotional law to the modern mind with its ideas of reconciliation. She must not come to them as a stranger who makes demands by divine authority, thus deepening the estrangement between them and herself. But she must come as one finding herself in the other, in re-uniting love. Yet love is not surrender, and Christian theology should not surrender to modern thought and its ideas of reconciliation. She should reconcile them by elevating them at the same time beyond themselves as *agape* does, and as great apologetic theology has always done. There are questions left in each of the ideas of estrangement and reconciliation, questions for which the Christian message is the ultimate answer. But again, this answer must not be superimposed on those who ask the questions. They must be won by it as the answer for which they are longing, the reconciling answer which is autonomous and theonomous together.

"WHOM THE GODS DESTROY"

Dorothy Wilbyrna Smith

On the afternoon of November 15, 1532, Francisco Pizarro and some one hundred and sixty weary companions reached the deserted town of Cajamarca, high in the western Andes. There they were to await the state visit of the Inca Atahualpa, whose army lay encamped south of the town. Anxious Spanish scouts, returning from a mission to the Inca, reported that they saw tents extending for a league, and warriors who must number more than thirty thousand. Yet by sunset of the following day, the camp was broken, the warriors were routed, and Atahualpa, Son of the Sun and Lord of the Four Parts of the World, was a Spanish prisoner. Pizarro's secretary, reporting the events of the day, wrote:[1]

> During the whole time no Indian raised his arms against a Spaniard. . . . It was a wonderful sight to see so great a lord taken prisoner in so short a time, who came in such power.

The wonder thus expressed has echoed down the centuries, for it was not only in Cajamarca that Amerindian resistance dissolved before the very eyes of the surprised Spaniards. As the pioneer Americanist, Daniel Brinton, observed, in 1868:

> Historians have marvelled at the instantaneous collapse of the empires of Mexico, Peru, the Mayas, and the Natchez, before a handful of Spanish filibusters. The fact is, wherever the whites appeared they were connected with those ancient predictions of the spirit of the dawn returning to claim his own. Obscure and ominous prophecies, "texts of bodeful song," rose in the memory of the natives, and paralyzed their arms.[2]

In our own time Dr. George Vaillant has written in a similar vein:

> The romantic circumstances which attended the fall of the Aztec civilization have long captured the fancy of the European world. A whole nation submitting to a handful of desperate soldiers offers a dramatic situation, seldom

1. Francisco Xeres, *A True Account of the Province of Cuzco, Called New Castille, Conquered by Francisco Pizarro, Captain to His Majesty the Emperor, Our Master.* 2nd ed. (Salamanca, 1547). In *Reports on the Discovery of Peru.* (London, 1872), pp. 55-56. Ed. by Clements R. Markham.

2. Daniel G. Brinton, *Myths of the New World* (New York, 1868), p. 187.

paralleled in our annals. . . . There are times in the histories of all peoples when the national will seems to disintegrate before intangible factors individually insignificant. . . . The Aztecs' war against the Spanish Conquistadors is an elusive example of the paralysis of national morale, followed by a defense carried on with that courage found in forsaken men, in this case forsaken by their very gods.[3]

Contributory to this elusive paralysis of morale had been the fact that "The years before the Spanish Conquest had, to the Aztecs, been full of portents suggestive of future evil."[4] As a result, Montezuma was faced with the problem of whether the Spaniards, though themselves mortal, were the vicars on earth of vast unearthly forces bent upon establishing a new social order.

Unfortunately, these psychological factors mentioned by Professor Brinton and Doctor Vaillant have been increasingly obscured by the materialistic interpretation of history. As a result, it has passed unnoticed that sixteenth century America was a social laboratory in which the doctrines of immanent and periodic change may be studied in dramatic detail.[5] The available evidence falls conveniently into two divisions. The first division concerns the philosophy upon which the Amerindian cultures were founded, and in which the origin of the Amerindian theories of immanent and periodic change must be sought. The second deals with the actual operation of the theories in the events of the sixteenth century.

To the first division, it would be difficult to find a more admirable introduction than the following quotation from Dr. Vaillant:

> Nature operates in a series of recurrences which give the effect of rhythms. Birth, maturity and death follow relentlessly in human life; night succeeds day; the stations of the year rotate endlessly through spring, summer, fall and winter; the planets move in eternal sequence through the sky. Thus to discover what those rhythms were and to follow their complicated but regular beat would, in Aztec philosophy, ensure the happy survival of the community.[6]

Were one to choose a single word to describe the Aztec government, it

3. George Vaillant, *Aztecs of Mexico.* (American Museum of Natural History, Science Series) (Garden City, N. Y. 1941), pp. 239-40.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 241.

5. Terminology borrowed from P. A. Sorokin. *Social and Cultural Dynamics.* 4 vols. (New York and Cincinnati, 1937-1941). For a discussion of cyclic conceptions of socio-cultural processes, see Vol. II, pp. 351-84, and Vol. IV, pp. 441-529, 621-68.

6. *Op. cit.*, pp. 169-70.

would be theocracy. The gods ruled; the priests interpreted and interposed, and the people obeyed, not the priests, but the rhythm of action whereby the gods lived.[7]

At the core of the Aztec religion stood the calendar, calculated in ritual periods of two hundred and sixty days and in solar years of three hundred and sixty-five days. Combined, the two measured a fifty-two year cycle at whose end the sacred fire was extinguished. The ending of two such cycles coincided with the ending of a Venus cycle. An intense observation of such ritual consumed a large part of the material and intellectual resources of the tribe.

The researches of many Americanists have shown that the Mayas, no less than the Aztecs, sought in a study of celestial rhythms an explanation of the cosmic plan. As for the Andean cultures, there has been some doubt whether they were based as exclusively upon astronomy and astrology as were those of Mexico and Yucatan. The old chroniclers did not report, from Peru, the Aztec and Maya belief that world history had been divided into four or five ages, each ending in catastrophe. Neither did they observe such intense preoccupation with calendrical cycles.

It would appear, therefore, that Andean astronomy was either more elementary or more esoteric than that in the north. Certain circumstances point toward the latter explanation, and the extensive researches of Mrs. Zelia Nuttall indicate that the same fundamental pattern of social organization and government had prevailed at Tiahuanaco, at Cuzco, among the Muyscas of Colombia, and in Central America, Yucatan and Mexico. The pattern was astronomical, and was based upon the apparent revolutions of the northern constellations about the Pole Star as the Sacred Middle, Navel or Axis of the universe. A report of Mrs. Nuttall's investigations was published in 1901 for the Peabody Museum at Harvard, under the title *The Fundamental Principles of Old and New World Civilizations.*

In 1937, an investigation of Amerindian calendrical science, complementary to that of Mrs. Nuttall, was reported by Señor Fritz Buck, Vice-president of the Sociedad Geographica of La Paz, under the title, *El Calendario Maya en la Cultura de Tiahuanacu.* Señor Buck's studies indicated that the Amerindian peoples from Mexico to Peru possessed

7. *Ibid.*, p. 187.

the same calendrical science, and that the tradition of world ages which the Spaniards heard in Yucatan and Mexico was expressed symbolically at Tiahuanaco, and at other places in ancient Peru. As mentioned earlier, the ages of world history were believed to number four or five. Each age had been under the guardianship of a different star or god, and each had ended in catastrophe by water, wind, earthquake, or famine. The end of the current age had been prophesied openly for some hundred years before the arrival of the Spaniards.

According to Señor Buck's researches, the Spaniards had arrived near the end of the fifth Amerindian calendrical era, which had begun in 3373 B.C. and would close in A.D. 1753. An era contained 5,200 solar years of 360 days, 3,600 lunar eclipse periods of 520 days, 7,200 ritual periods of 260 days, and 2,400 Martian cycles of 780 days. Thus the span of world history, made up of five such eras, would be 26,000 years of 360 days, or approximately the precessional cycle.

Such precessional calculations have seldom been attributed to the Amerindians, except among theosophists. Professor Brinton, for example, noted the similarity between the world age theories of the eastern and western hemispheres, yet failed to find any evidence that the Amerindians calculated their eras as part of a precessional Great Year, at whose end the stars apparently returned to an original position. It seems obvious, however, that a study of the precessional movement would be the natural outcome of a prolonged observation of the Pole Star. Mrs. Nuttall found evidence that acute anxiety filled the minds of Amerindian watchers when the pattern of the northern sky began to change. Astronomer priests were sent out in search of some spot from which the familiar sky order could still be seen. Stability of the Sacred Center, both in the sky and on the earth, came to be of tremendous (and probably reciprocal) importance. The Zunis, for example, told of long migrations in search of a stable middle of the earth on which to found their sacred city.[8] Having found it, they continued to make annual tests of the stability of the Middle, in middle time.

8. There is an interesting parallel in the *Nihongi*, where the Emperor Jimmu suggests to the Imperial Princes that they go to a fair land in the East which is, doubtless, the center of the world, "suitable for the *extension of the Heavenly task*," and build a capital city there. It is especially significant that this passage is quoted by Kishio Satomi in *Japanese Civilization, Its Significance and Realization* (New York, 1924), pp. 191-93.

Some of the Amerindian evidence suggests that, in a culture based upon an astronomical pattern, emerging knowledge of the precession may have lead to changes in history as well as in prophecy. It would also appear that the duration of the Amerindian eras may have been determined by the coincidental ending of the largest number of conspicuous cycles which could be calculated in interchangeable numerical values magically important. The 5,200 year era of 360 days did not include an ending of a Venus cycle, but 5,200 years of 365 days did tally with 3,250 Venus cycles.

A further point of interest is the possible relation of the 260 day ritual period to the 26,000 year grand cycle. The 260 day *tonalamatl* or *tzolkin* is called by Dr. Herbert Spinden the most fundamental feature of the time counts of Mexico and Central America. Yet lacking an astronomical explanation, it has been regarded as an invention. One *tzolkin* was intercalated at the end of a 52 year period of 360 days to make a 52 year period of 365 days. As it happens, the difference between two widely accepted zero dates for the Maya time count is 260 years. One wonders, therefore, whether there may have been some effort to intercalate a 260 year period at the end of a 5,200 year era. Señor Buck, accepting 3373 B.C. as the zero date of the fifth era, supposed its end to be A.D. 1753. But if 3113 B.C. be taken as the zero date, the end of the Amerindian grand cycle would come in A.D. 2013.

All this makes an interesting parallel to calculations in the Eastern Hemisphere. New calendar cycles began in Egypt and India in 3102 B.C. As for the end of the present age, which ends the Great Year, it is widely connected with the end of the precessional era of Pisces, that is, A.D. 2000 by Dr. Jeremias' calculations. The close is sometimes said to be preceded by three hundred years of twilight, which would thus begin in A.D. 1700. There is a hint of further similarities in a legend heard by Father Molina in a province east of Cuzco. The natives there told how, before the great flood which had caused one of the two previous destructions of the world,

> their sheep displayed much sadness, eating no food in the daytime, and watching the stars at night. At last the shepherd who had charge of them asked them what ailed them, and they said that the conjunction of stars showed that the world would be destroyed by water.[9]

9. *Narratives of the Rites and Laws of the Incas.* Tr. and ed., Clements R. Markham. (London, 1873), pp. 8-9.

There is some suggestion here of the Babylonian belief that the world would be destroyed at the solstices of the Great Year. The summer solstice, when all the planets came together in the sign of Cancer, would bring destruction by fire; the winter solstice, when the planets were reunited in the sign of Cancer, would bring destruction by water.

By way of summarizing this first section of evidence dealing with the background of the Amerindian theories of immanent and periodic change, one might say that the sixteenth century Amerindian states were planned to duplicate on earth the supposed pattern of the cosmos. This pattern may have been deduced from the movements of the circumpolar constellations around the Pole Star of the period. The pattern was certainly timed by calendrical cycles, and by the sixteenth century of the Christian era the end of the current world age was being openly predicted. Columbus heard of such predictions in Haiti, and they have been recorded in some detail for Mexico, Yucatan, and Peru. According to Professor Brinton, similar prophecies of doom had been handed down from time immemorial among the Winnebagos, the Chikasaws, the Mandans, the Pueblos, the Muyscas of Bogota, the Botocudos of Brazil, and the Araucanians of Chile. The end of the existing order was frequently associated, in these prophecies, with the number thirteen.

For a brief consideration of the second section of evidence, dealing with the actual operation of cyclic theories of history among the sixteenth Amerindians, events in Peru offer an excellent introduction. A few years after the Spaniards had so easily seized the sacred person of Atahualpa, one of his cousins, an Inca princess, became the wife of a Spanish nobleman, Garcilaso de la Vega. Their son, of the same name, wrote a history of Peru, entitled *The Royal Commentaries.* In it, he told how he had inquired of an old Inca noble, who was talking with his mother,

> . . . how it came to pass that this Countrey, being so rocky and mountainous as it is, and the people warlike, so that they could make Conquests of many Provinces, and form a mighty Empire, how, I say, it came to pass that they should submit, and render themselves to so small and so inferior a number as the Spaniards were? In answer unto which he repeated the old Prophecy concerning the Spaniards, telling me, that the Inca had commanded them to obey and serve them, as a people endued with many more excellencies than they; and having said this, he turned to me, and with anger in his face, reproved me

for having termed them Cowards, and unwise; and in answer to my demand he told me, That the last words which our Inca uttered whereby he commanded us to resign our Empire, and subject ourselves to a stranger Nation, were much more powerful and available than all the Force and Arms which your Father and his Companions brought into this Countrey.[10]

In somewhat more detail, Huayna Capac's dying admonition ran as follows:

. . . in the last place he told them, that there was an old Prophecy, derived by Revelation from his Father the Sun, That after the reign of twelve kings there should come a new nation, never before known in these parts, that they should gain and subject all these Kingdoms and Provinces, with many others, to their own Dominion: which I greatly suspect to be those who now sail upon Our Coast, being a valiant people, much surpassing us in all points of Excellency. Likewise you are to observe, that in me the number of Twelve Kings is completed; and I further made known to you, that in a few years after my departure out of this life, that this new nation will invade you, and will then be accomplished that which our Father the Sun hath revealed, that they shall become your Lords and Masters. Wherefore I encharge you to serve them as men, for they in everything have the advantage of you; their Law is better than yours, their Arms and military Discipline more warlike and more invincible.[11]

According to other chroniclers, the approaching end of Inca rule had been prophesied as far back as the time of Huayna Capac's grandfather, and during the intervening years a long series of evil omens had presaged calamity. A comparable situation evidently existed in Yucatan. The following prophetic verses, dating from 1450 and 1469 respectively, were accepted by Professor Brinton as authentic:

At the close of the thirteenth age of the world,
While the cities of Itza and Tancah still flourish,
The sign of the Lord of the Sky will appear,
The light of the dawn will illumine the land,
And the cross will be seen by the nations of men,
A father to you will be be, Itzalnos,
A brother to you, ye natives of Tancah;
Receive well the bearded guests who are coming,
Bringing the sign of the Lord from the daybreak,
Of the Lord of the Sky, so clement and powerful.[12]

10. Garcilaso de la Vega, *The Royal Commentaries of Peru.* Tr., Sir P. Rycaut (London, 1688), p. 375. For further descriptions of the effect of the prophecies see pp. 441-64.

11. *Ibid.* 374-75.

12. *Op. cit.*, p. 188.

Ye men of Itza, hearken to the tidings,
Listen to the forecast of this cycle's end;
Four have been the ages of the world's progressing,
Now the fourth is ending, and its end is near.
A mighty lord is coming, see you give him honor;
A potent lord approaches, to whom all must bow;
I, the prophet, warn you, keep in mind my boding,
Men of Itza, mark it, and await your lord.[13]

These representative prophecies illustrate possibilities or probabilities which emerge from a more extensive study of the subject. One of the probabilities is the existence of a prophetic pattern, known throughout America and based upon astronomical calculations. It evidently called for the displacement of existing rulers, laws, and cults at the end of the current calendrical era. One Maya prophecy is explicit on this subject, stating:

At the close of the ages, it hath been decreed:
Shall perish and vanish each weak god of men,
And the earth shall be purged with a ravening fire.[14]

The new age would then have a different celestial guardian and a new ruling hierarchy. The new rulers would be known by certain characteristics (probably symbolical) among which were beards and fair skins. They would carry the cross, which in Mexico bore the name "Tree of Our Life" or "Tree of Our Flesh," and would come from the east or the northeast. They would be messengers of Quetzalcoatl in Mexico, and of Viracocha (Illa Tici Uira Cocha, literally Light-Beginning-Storehouse of creation-Abyss) in Peru.

Huayna Capac and the Maya priests obviously believed that the only safe course lay in submitting to and co-operating with these expected messengers of Virachocha or Quetzalcoatl, respectively. They therefore charged their people to accept what they believed to be the cosmic plan. Yet evidence from Peru shows that such counsel was not given joyfully. Beginning with Huayna Capac's grandfather, each Inca was saddened by the predicted doom of his line. Auguries were continually tried, in hope that the verdict might be reversed. The army was

13. *Essays of an Americanist* (Philadelphia, 1890), p. 302.
14. *Myths of the New World*, p. 221.

strengthened, and internal concord emphasized. Nevertheless, word came that Viracocha and his blond and bearded messengers had appeared along the coast, in a house that floated on the water. Hence the dying Huayna Capac commanded that the Inca caste should resign their empire to the strangers, because it was the will of his Father, the Sun, and of Viracocha. Algonquin traditions were still more explicit regarding submission to the divine plan. They foretold that, on that dreadful day when Michabo would stamp his feet in anger, "only a pair, or only, at most, those who have maintained inviolate the institutions he ordained, will he protect and preserve to inhabit the new world he will then fabricate."[15]

The political importance of such a system of thought is obvious. One possible consequence is shown by the experience of the Spaniards, who happened to arrive at the psychological time, from the east, carrying T-shaped crosses, and having beards and fair skins. They themselves marveled at their easy conquests, but being devout believers in ethical monotheism, attributed their victories to the will of Jehovah, who had planned through them to save the Amerindians from the worship of Lucifer. They were soon puzzled by the results of their missionary endeavors, and perhaps the Amerindians were puzzled by the results of their submission to cosmic command. The picture has been further obscured, in recent years, by the materialistic interpretation of history so popular in the United States.

However, a considerable portion of the world's population is still committed to a belief in some predestined cosmic pattern, and the twentieth century has brought an attempted merger of ancient astro-politics with recent astro-physics. It is, therefore, legitimate to inquire regarding the alternatives to an *accidental* appearance of a new leader or conquering group at the psychological time. One alternative, certainly, is the *planned* appearance of such a leader or group at the psychological time. Such an appearance might easily be engineered by persons who did not believe in any Cosmic Plan, but who saw in it a means of putting an end to the existing order, and of seizing power themselves. It might also be engineered by persons who did believe in a cosmic plan, and thought themselves destined to fulfill it. Atahualpa, for example, might have been impelled by some such idea when he

15. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

overthrew his half-brother Huascar, son of Huayna Capac and his sister-wife, who had succeeded their father as Inca. Hence Huascar became the thirteenth Inca, whose overthrow had been predicted for many years. Also, the auguries regarding Huascar personally had been unfavorable. Atahualpa, on the other hand, had not been involved in the auguries consulted at Huayna Capac's death, and on his mother's side he was not an Inca, but probably a descendant of the former rulers of Quito. He may have hoped that by overthrowing Huascar, the thirteenth Inca, he could start a new dynasty, thus fulfilling the letter of the prophecies, and saving the empire from the rule of the expected strangers. But before he could reach Cuzco to receive the fringe, after defeating Huascar, the strangers appeared again along the coast, and Atahualpa turned back toward Cajamarca to meet them—and destiny.

Two other possible reactions to the belief in a cosmic plan appeared in the north. In 1524, Cortez reached an inaccessible region in what is now the borderland between Yucatan and Guatemala. He found there the descendants of people who had left Chichen-Itza some hundred years before. One reason given for their migration was the fear inspired by prophecies that the end of the era was approaching. Possibly they were seeking a stable Middle where they might survive the catastrophe. The Amerindian expression for "the end of the world" did not mean complete physical destruction, but a time of limited availability. In the Valley of Mexico, the Aztecs had adopted still another course. When the Spaniards arrived, they were attempting to rejuvenate the failing celestial powers with human hearts. It was reported that in one temple dedication in 1486, the procession of sacrificial victims extended for two miles. But these efforts at celestial stabilization had already antagonized their earthly neighbors. Had the Spaniards not arrived, the neighbors might have been driven to initiate a new order themselves to stop the sacrificial mania of the Aztecs.

A study of the sixteenth century Amerindians thus shows that theories of immanent and periodic social change may produce a variety of practical results, all of them unpredictable from the viewpoint held by Darwinian materialists. The sequels throw some light upon the ways in which deities and culture heroes become merged, and Messianic legends develop. Thus Montezuma, by the nineteenth century, had taken on the character ascribed to Quetzalcoatl in the sixteenth century. From coast to coast and from the Gila River to Nicaragua,

Montezuma was revered by the Indians as the founder of their institutions and the sovereign of their Golden Age. In the legends of New Mexico, he had become the founder of the pueblos, who had entrusted to their guardianship the sacred fire. On departing he had planted a tree, and promised that, when the tree should fall and the fire die out, he would return from the far east and lead his loyal people to victory and power. In 1846, when the tree fell and the guardian of the sacred fire was found dead in its dead embers, when Yankees occupied the lands of the Indians and strange diseases desolated their homes, the hour of deliverance was thought to be at hand. Each morning, at earliest dawn, a watcher mounted to the housetops and gazed long and anxiously into the lightening east, hoping to see the noble form of Montezuma advancing through the morning beams at the head of a conquering army.[16]

In Peru, the last of the Incas was believed to have fled to a kingdom beyond the Andes, from which he would eventually return to drive the haughty Spaniards into the sea. This belief played an important part in the frequent and bloody Indian rebellions. There is some reason to believe that plans are under way in Tokyo to capitalize upon the same belief at some future time.

In closing, one might hazard from the Amerindian evidence the following generalizations. First, the various theories of immanent and periodic change merit careful consideration because of their possible political consequences. Second, their origin is to be sought, not in natural law as verified by modern astronomy and astro-physics and not in revelation, but in the obsolete patterns of geocentric astronomy as interpreted by sympathetic magic. Is it not ironic that, for all our tremendous facilities for research and popularization, these ancient delusions should be allowed to ravage our twentieth-century world?

16. The continual emphasis upon "Dawn" by millenial cults at the present time is an interesting parallel. Cf. "Rising Sun." In *Tokyo Record* (New York, 1943), pp. 405-27, Otto D. Tolischus gives the text of Professor Chikao Fujisawa's propagandist work, *The Great Shinto Purification Ritual and the Divine Mission of Nippon, A Prophecy of the Dawn of a New Age,* which is worthy of serious study.

"THE FREEBORN MIND":* A REVIEW ARTICLE

JOSEPH L. BLAU

IN RECENT years, partly under the stimulus of studies in semantics and partly as a phase of the intensified political conflict in America, there have been various attempts to reanalyze and re-evaluate the clichés in which we tend to express the basic elements in our conception of democracy. Possibly the most famous of such attempts was the now celebrated debate on freedom of the press, in which publisher Frank Gannett and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes belabored each other with alternative definitions without being able to reach any common ground. Less publicized, but probably of more significance, are such books as Thurman Arnold's *Folklore of Capitalism* and Stuart Chase's *Tyranny of Words*. Recent events developing out of the prosecutions of individuals for subversive activity have led to a re-examination of the concept of freedom of speech. The discussion which followed Vice-President Wallace's address of May 8, 1942 before the Free World Association centered in the meaning of such terms as "the common man" and "freedom."

It is my intention, as far as it is possible to do so briefly, to sketch here the categories under which a similar reappraisal of the concept of religious freedom might be made and to indicate the respects in which the two books under consideration[1] contribute to this reappraisal. These three concepts, or major possibilities for interpretation of religious freedom, are represented in movements of thought which have existed in America of the past and still exist in America of the present. Within certain limits, however, it is possible to ascribe to each of the three interpretations one or more dominant periods and to discover in

* "Absurd and vain attempt to bind
With iron chains, the freeborn mind!
To force conviction, and reclaim
The wandering, by destructive flame!"

Quoted by Merle Curti, *The Growth of American Thought* (New York, 1943), p. 163, from the opening hymn of Jeremy Belknap's collection (published 1795) which was very popular in Unitarian circles.

1. Albert Post, *Popular Freethought in America, 1825-1850*. New York; Columbia University Press, 1943. 258 pp. $3.00.
Sidney Warren, *American Freethought, 1860-1914*. New York; Columbia University Press, 1943. 257 pp. $3.25.

American intellectual history the traces of this dominance. It is also possible to point to periods during which there was a struggle for supremacy between two of these interpretations. Thus these concepts can be used to provide a structure within which future studies in American religious history can be organized.

Religious freedom may be interpreted as freedom *of* religion, as freedom *for* religion, or as freedom *from* religion. *Freedom of religion* implies the freedom of the individual to enter into any religious association he desires. It is undoubtedly the most usual interpretation of religious freedom, for it suggests the time-honored formula, "the right to worship God as one pleases." It should not require demonstration that the concept of freedom of worship goes beyond this right to the corresponding duty of permitting every other person the same right; this suggests that the history of freedom of worship in America is essentially the history of the development of toleration in America. It is not to the Calvinistic theocrats of Massachusetts Bay, whose interest in freedom of worship was in the freedom to establish their own religion not *beside* other religions, but *instead of* other religions, that we must look for the parentage of freedom of worship. It is to Roger Williams and to William Penn, both of whom recognized the duty of tolerance as well as the right of choice. The right to worship in any existent church when only one church is permitted to exist, is an empty and meaningless right.

This conception of religious freedom as freedom of worship was dominant especially during the years immediately before and after 1776. It was gradually approached through the entire colonial period and had become firmly entrenched in the American mind by 1787. Its most striking formulation is in the Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, written by Thomas Jefferson and passed by the General Assembly of Virginia in 1786. Some last outposts remained to be cleared of the accumulation of centuries of intolerance,[2] but the basic principle had won; since 1787, it has been attacked but never overthrown. Among these attacks should be included such essentially political movements

2. See, for example, Joseph L. Blau, "The Maryland 'Jew Bill,'" *Review of Religion*, VIII (1944), pp. 225-39. The right of the Jews to full religious freedom was even later recognized in post-Puritan Massachusetts.

as the "Know-Nothing" movement of the mid-nineteenth century and the later Ku Klux Klan, as well as the National Reform Association, which attempted in the eighteen-seventies to lobby for the passage of an amendment declaring the United States a Christian nation, to enforce stricter legal regulations for the Sabbath, and to press for more Bible instruction in the public schools.[3]

Freedom for religion is an altogether different category. It is essentially a distortion of tolerance, an ingenious and deliberate misinterpretation of the concept of religious freedom. Freedom of worship was seen to be the most widely recognized interpretation of religious freedom; freedom for religion is the least recognized interpretation. The right to freedom of worship involves the duty of allowing freedom of worship to others; to this great end, the secular arm was forbidden to legislate concerning the establishment of any sect or the prohibition of any form of worship. The meaning and intention of the first amendment to the Constitution is crystal clear. This clarity, however, has been muddied over a period of years; if any action or projected action of government has been objectionable to any sect, the action has been attacked as interference with freedom of religion. Thus, for example, when gambling, which in a comparatively innocuous form was the main support of many churches in New York City, was under attack by the city administration, the attempts of the police to stop the gambling in churches was decried as persecution of religious bodies, and hence interference with religious liberty. This is, perhaps, a trivial matter, yet the principle involved here is a significant one. It is tantamount to a declaration that religious organizations have legal rights beyond those of other organizations, including a virtual veto power over desirable social legislation. If this seems an overstatement, consider the fact that a Child Labor Amendment to the Constitution has been held up for years because one religious organization does not consider such action desirable.

Freedom for religion is a concept within which much of the recent religious history of the United States may be studied. It is, comparatively, a new development in this country and has not, therefore, re-

3. Dr. Warren's presentation of the aims and policies of the National Reform Association is good. *American Freethought 1860-1914*, pp. 176-79.

ceived all the consideration it deserves.[4] The present era reveals its workings most clearly. It has one finger in education; in several states, parochial schools are receiving subsidies, contrary to the direct intention of their education laws. In New York State, for example, the subsidy takes the form of free bus transportation for the pupils of parochial schools. Another form which freedom for religion in the field of education takes is "released time" for religious instruction. This has been upheld by the highest state courts.[5] Bible reading in the public schools is another case of religious penetration into secular education.

Most recently there has developed the tendency to mask political action behind a religious front. This is a reversal of the attitude of the National Reform Association, which used openly political techniques to achieve a religious end. Such organizations as the Christian Front, the Christian Mobilizers, and many others are attempting to use the widespread belief that because religion is sacred, religious organizations are sacrosanct—freedom for religion—to shield their political designs from attack.

The third concept, *freedom from religion,* includes several subcategories which require careful discrimination. It includes some who desire the total abolition of all religion, others who would retain religious organization without a belief in an intervening deity, still others whose objection is to church influence on government rather than to religion, and, possibly most numerous, those who object only to the clergy. If names must be given to these different groups, they may be called "militant atheists," "liberal religionists," "secularists," and "anticlericals." For broad purposes of classification, all of these groups may be placed under the general rubric of freethinkers. Both Post and Warren in-

4. Its manifestations are, however, discernible with increasing frequency. So, for example, *The New York Times* of April 7, 1944 reported the following proclamation issued by the Mayor and Council of Fort Lee, N. J.: "This is the holy season of Lent, and it is in keeping with the American way of life that tribute be paid to the divine saviour. Therefore, the Mayor and Council of the Borough of Fort Lee request that all business establishments in the community close their places of business on Good Friday, April 7, 1944, between the hours of 12 noon and 3 P.M. as a mark of respect to the passion of the divine saviour."

5. See, for example *The Court Opinions Upholding the Legality of the Release by Public Schools of Time for Religious Education.* (The Greater New York Federation of Churches, 1927), in which the decisions in New York State are hailed as rescuing "our public school system . . . from being an unwilling agent in consecrating secularism as the religion of America" (p. 1).

clude material on all of these types of free thought without any adequate attempt to make the needed discriminations.

To make the distinction is important and necessary, because a very real part of the American heritage, perhaps that part which is most genuinely American, is anticlerical without being antireligious. Resentment of domination by an external, imposed power has been the center not of American political life alone, but also of its religious life. Our early development of a strong congregationalism indicates a trend, though it does not prove the point, because of the strong central position of the minister within the congregation. The emergence of the frontier sects such as Methodism, with the resultant development of lay preaching, continues the trend, and brings the point closer to proof. The real proof, however, is to be sought in the writings of those who, like Jefferson, believed in Jesus, possibly even in Christianity, but resented the dogmatisms and the vested interest of professional clerics. The real proof is to be seen, for example, in the work of Joel Barlow, whose early *Columbiad* linked priests and kings as the twin sources of evil.

> Two settled slaveries thus the race control,
> Engross their labors and debase their soul;
> Till creeds and crimes and feuds and fears compose
> The seeds of war and all its kindred woes.[6]

It is, perhaps, not merely fancy to feel in the anticlerical lines of Barlow a suggestion of that older poet who recognized so clearly that "Mankind, in Wretched Bondage held, lay groveling on the ground, galled with the Yoke of what is called *Religion*; from the Sky this Tyrant shewed her Head, and with grim Looks hung over us poor Mortals here below."[7] For Barlow, too, talks of "the bondage of the mind" that "spreads deeper glooms and subjugates mankind."[8]

6. Barlow, *Columbiad*, IX, 185-88.

7. "Humana ante oculos foede cum vita jaceret
In terris oppressa gravi sub Religione,
Quae caput a coeli regionibus ostendebant,
Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans."
Lucretius, *De rerum natura*, I, 63-66. The translation is that of the version printed London, 1743.

8. Barlow, *Columbiad*, IV, 79-80.

Barlow, however, wrote hymns and published a hymnal which was fairly popular for a time among the Congregationalists. Evidently he saw no contradiction between writing for religion and against the clergy. Perhaps he would have gone as far as to say that, in writing against priesthood and the church, he was writing in the best interests of religion.[9] Certainly no honest cleric within traditional Christianity could conceivably have approved the hymn from which the title of these random reflections upon freedom of thought was taken. Without attempting to write the complete interpretation of all the materials that Drs. Post and Warren have put into their books, I should like to quote from Thoreau to indicate the continuity of religious anticlericalism in America:

> Consider the snappish tenacity with which they preach Christianity still. What are time and space to Christianity, eighteen hundred years, and a new world?—that the humble life of a Jewish peasant should have force to make a New York bishop so bigoted. . . . It is necessary not to be a Christian to appreciate the beauty and significance of the life of Christ. . . . The wisest man preaches no doctrine; he has no scheme; he sees no rafter, not even a cobweb, against the heavens. . . . It is remarkable that, notwithstanding the universal favor with which the New Testament is outwardly received, and even the bigotry with which it is defended, there is no hospitality shown to, there is no appreciation of, the order of truth with which it deals.[10]

Thoreau was ready to give up his Christianity, not because of what it was inherently, but because of what the men of religion had made of it; under no circumstances, however, could he have given up his Christ. Fine, moralizing reflections, indeed, for a Sunday spent in a boat on the river!

This is radical anticlericalism, but it stems from the "freeborn mind" of America, which, in its turn, sprang from a protestant attitude that would cut through the centuries of clerical obfuscation of the Scriptures, and in its extreme expression would make every man his own interpreter. This individualism in religious teaching ties closely to the Hebrew tradition. For many centuries there was no such

9. See Barlow, *Political Writings* (New York, 1796) p. 35 *n*, and his reply to the Abbé Gregoire's strictures on the *Columbiad*, published in Charles Burr Todd, *Life and Letters of Joel Barlow* (New York, 1886), pp. 221-33.

10. Henry Thoreau, *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers* (Boston, 1893), pp. 84, 85, 88, 91.

thing as a Jewish minister; the Rabbi was a teacher only because he was a master scholar. He was not even a man of religion professionally; rather he was a man of ordinary affairs, often of very humble position, who, in his studies in both the Written and Oral Law, had gone further than those who sat under him. The professional religionist, the cleric, developed first almost by accident in American Jewry, and for many years had little position among his own people.[11] The Jews were essentionally democratic in worship. Partly in the light of this tradition we can explain the presence of Jews, even of Rabbis, among the freethinkers instanced by Warren. We must not, however, neglect to consider the possibility that some of these Jewish "freethinkers" supported the Free Religious Association and other such groups as an alternative to the possible loss of civil liberties, or even of the right to worship in their own way, which might have followed a successful campaign for the so-called "Christian amendment" by the National Reform Association.

Then, too, we must take into consideration the fact that members of minority groups in America have always been strongly convinced of the necessity for maintaining the separation of church and state. Rabbis who took part in the activities of the American Secular Union were profoundly disturbed when they discovered members and even leaders of this organization trying to convert it into a movement for the destruction of religion rather than a movement for the prevention of a church establishment.[12]

There must have been many non-Jews who supported these Jewish leaders, whose approach to the secular movement was the same as theirs. For secularism, the absolute separation of church and state, is another concept dear to the American mind. It was organized bigotry playing upon the fear of losing this separateness that produced the ugly whispering campaign against Alfred E. Smith in 1928. It is a conscious and developed secularism which must be called into play if what I have called "freedom for religion" is to be stopped short of the danger point.

I say conscious and developed secularism because, in a day of organ-

11. For details see the forthcoming *History of the Jewish Community of New York, 1654-1860* by Hyman B. Grinstein (Philadelphia, probably 1944).

12. See, for example, the experience of David Philipson in 1891, as narrated in his *My Life as an American Jew* (Cincinnati, 1941), pp. 75-76.

ized pressure groups, disestablishment is not enough to guarantee the separation of the state from religious influence. When the Anglican Church in Virginia was disestablished in 1785, protagonists of this legislation felt that secularism had been achieved; when the first amendment to the constitution forbade a national establishment, secularists felt that their object had been permanently won. This was, as later events have shown, a naïvely optimistic view. By 1872, the churches were in the saddle once more; in that year, as Warren points out, a formal statement of nine demands of American secularists was published in the *Index*.[13] The essence of these demands is that indirect religious influence should be eliminated from the government even as direct religious influence had been. These demands have not been met: church property is still tax-exempt; chaplains are more than ever used and publicized in the armed services; public appropriations for sectarian institutions have increased; the Bible is still read in public schools; the President of the United States and the Governors of the several states still proclaim religious festivals; simple affirmation has not been substituted for judicial oath; Sunday observance laws remain on the statute books; laws still look to "the enforcement of 'Christian morality' "; in the practical administration of the government privileges and advantages are conceded to religious bodies.

What has happened to American secularism? At the risk of restating the obvious, let me suggest that while religion has progressed, secularism has largely remained in the same place. Secularism, except where it has been organized, has rested content in the formal elimination of church influence in government; the churches have realized that they can have as much or more influence informally, because not only the established church, but also all other churches can exert pressure on government. Truly prophetic has come to seem Joel Barlow's warning:

> Think not, my friends, the patriot's task is done,
> Or Freedom safe, because the battle's won.
> Unnumber'd foes, far different arms that wield,
> Wait the weak moment when she quits her shield.[14]

Of militant atheists there have been few in America; of liberal religionists there have been and still are many. The controversy over

13. See Warren, pp. 161-62.
14. *The Columbiad,* VIII, 79-82.

evolution made many new liberal religionists, for the significant difficulty in the acceptance of the developmental hypothesis was not what this belief did to man, but what it did to God. The most cursory reading of the literature of the period makes it clear that the stumbling-block was the need to accompany evolutionary belief with rejection or modification of the belief in a constantly intervening, immanent Deity. God became exclusively the First Cause who set into operation the action of Natural Law; all later effects are produced mediately, through secondary causation.

This was not, however, the only way in which believers in the results of science were forced into a relaxation of some aspects of traditional religious orthodoxy. The impulse to liberal religion came as much from the dogmatism of the traditionalists as it did from the new hypotheses of science. Consider, for example, these statements by the eminent Presbyterian and Princeton professor, Charles Hodge:

> Banishing God from the world is simply intolerable, and blessed be his name, impossible. An absent God who does nothing is, to us, no God. It may be said that Christ did not teach science. True, but He taught truth; and science, so called, when it comes in conflict with truth, is what man is when he comes in conflict with God.
>
> The truth of this [the Scriptural] theory of the universe rests . . . on the infallible authority of the Word of God. . . . The truth of this doctrine . . . rests not only on the authority of the Scriptures, but on the very constitution of our natures. The Bible has little charity for those who reject it. It pronounces them to be either derationalized or demoralized, or both.[15]

Even granting that this is the dogmatism of hysteria, and that the more philosophical James McCosh, at the same University, in the same religious tradition, found it possible to make his peace with the developmental theory, it is evident that, if this blind authoritarianism, this rigid attempt to control the human mind is orthodoxy, there will always be many sincerely religious, but "freeborn" minds who will refuse to accept it. This type of theological one-way thinking, in America, at least, will alienate a far larger number of people than it will attract.

This is the significance of the warning which Dr. J. L. Cabell, of the University of Virginia, introduced into his *Unity of Mankind*:

> If theologians rashly stake the authority of the Bible on the adoption of a particular set of scientific opinions, each of which they hold to be the "articulus

15. Charles Hodge, *What is Darwinism?* (New York, 1874), pp. 74, 75, 5-7.

stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae," they should not be surprised if the exclusive votaries of science, accepting the issue thus inconsiderately presented, should come to regard with aversion a theology associated, as they have been led to believe, with propositions which they know to be both false and absurd. And thus it often happens, even at the present day, that the premature alarms of the timid friends of our holy religion, and their denunciations of free scientific inquiry, become the determining cause of the very infidelity they would deprecate.[16]

What have Drs. Post and Warren contributed to the understanding of the types of thought which I have tried here to sketch, in their relation to the continuing passion of the American mind for freedom from all forms of authority? Both have amassed large quantities of material. Dr. Post, in particular, by his concentration on the free thought of the American in the mass, rather than that of the leaders of the intellectual life of the country, has brought into sharper focus the broad, popular base on which freethought organizations were founded. His detailed study of the many freethought periodicals of the second quarter of the nineteenth century is of value in establishing the social history of the movement. Dr. Warren, who is somewhat less concerned with the mass basis of freethought, attempts to write "a chapter in the intellectual history of the nation," as Allan Nevins calls the work in his "Introduction."[17] His canvass is broader than Post's; he is concerned with more than the questions of "disbelief in divine revelation and overruling Providence" which Dr. Post set as his limits.[18]

Both, however, suffer from the same deficiency, the writing of intellectual history without an adequate understanding of the intellectual workings of the movement about which they write. Warren attempts to a far greater degree than does Post an analysis of freethought from this point of view. Unfortunately his inner understanding is based too much on monographs by other historians who manifest the same failing. For example, much external detail of the career of Francis Ellingwood Abbot as freethought editor and writer is presented; it is nowhere even suggested that Abbot was a philosopher, one of whose works, *The Syllogistic Philosophy* (Boston, 1906), is entitled to serious consideration as an intellectual formulation, who wrote several rea-

16. J. L. Cabell, *The Testimony of Modern Science to the Unity of Mankind* (New York, 1859), pp. 12-13.
17. Warren, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
18. Post, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

soned statements of a philosophy of his type of free thought, *Religion and Science* (New York, 1874); *Scientific Theism* (Boston, 1885); *The Way out of Agnosticism: or, The Philosophy of Free Religion* (Boston, 1890). Surely Dr. Warren might have profited by a careful reading of these works to determine the inner coherence of freethought as a system in one of its leading exponents. With this understanding he might have derived even more than he has from his studies in periodicals, newspapers, and pamphlets.

Even if these books are accepted on their own level, as mere external history, there are minor points of criticism that might be made. For example, despite the listing of so many freethought periodicals in both books, one of the most interesting, the *Radical,* has apparently not been consulted; Felix Adler's connection with the Free Religious Association is mentioned by Warren, and Dr. Adler is identified as the founder of the Ethical Culture Society. The Society is not, however, discussed, although it is one of the most significant and long-lived liberal religious organizations. Dr. Post fails to give adequate consideration to the contributions of the transcendentalists to freethought. Thoreau is not mentioned in his book. Theodore Parker is very cursorily considered. Emerson is granted one passing reference, in spite of the fact that his Divinity School Address of July 15, 1838 is in many respects a charter for the liberal religionist. Altogether, in seeking for evidence of freethought in the popular mind, Post seems to have found the popular, but to have neglected the mind, to have traced the freedom without tracing the thought.

I do not wish to belabor these points; there is much of value for an understanding of freethought in the materials collected in these two volumes. The services of the authors lie in the collection; others must take up the burden of supplying the keys to the understanding. It is my hope that this brief statement will prove of some help in leading to a fuller understanding of the sources and nature of the freethought movement in the American mind.

COMMUNICATIONS

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA TO "BRYTHONIC CHRISTIANITY"

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Since the publication of my study on "Brythonic Christianity" in the number of this *Review* for November, 1942, I have been favored with such valuable additions and corrections, through the kindness of Canon Gilbert H. Doble (who has justly received the degree of Doctor of Divinity from Oxford for his researches in Cornish hagiography) and Fathers Silas M. Harris and Arthur W. Wade-Evans, that it seems well worth while to record them as a supplement to my article.

P. 7, line 16. Roscarrock was a Cornishman, not Welsh.

P. 8, note 10, line 5. Read "Germanus" instead of "David" (p. 21, note 46, line 4. Read *"David"* instead of *"Davidis"*; the name was regarded as indeclinable). A complete Welsh Proper of St. David in a Hereford manuscript has been printed and discussed by Wade-Evans in his *Saint David in the Liturgy* (University of Wales Press, 1940).

P. 9, line 25. The feast of St. Clitaucus is 3 November rather than 19 August. Line 21. St. Congarus belongs, rather, to the fifth century; † 473, according to the *Annals of Ulster* (cf. also Duine, *Memento,* no. 106).

P. 10, line 21. The feast of St. Deiniolus is 11 September rather than 23 November. Line 35. SS. Fingarus and Gwinear were probably two different Saints, one Irish, the other Brythonic.

P. 14, line 40. The best Welsh form of Winfreda is Gwenfrewy.

P. 15, note 13, line 3. Dinnurin was probably named after St. Guron and is the old name of Bodmin. Kenstec was abbot-bishop of Bodmin, and there is no Dingerein in Cornwall (cf. *CSS* XI[3], 27-28; XLI, 9, 17-18).

P. 17, note 17, add: Penn Ohen is a blunder for the *pagus* of Penychen, a district of Glamorgan. Note 18, line 7. Before the Revolution, Nantes, like all of Loire-Inférieure, was in Brittany, and throughout the Middle Ages was in constant rivalry with Rennes to be regarded as the capital.

P. 19, note 33, line 5. Read "duabus alis ex utraque parte," etc.

P. 26, line 24. *Tre-* is found in Wales in *Tregaean* (St. Caean), *Tregaron* (St. Caron), and possibly in *Tregynon* (St. Cynon) in Montgomeryshire.

P. 27, line 4. Read "usually not that" instead of "never that." Canon Doble writes (July 17, 1943): "*Lanbrobois* (St. Probus) and *Lanachebran* (St. Keverne) in Domesday are exceptions. It is an important point, but at present obscure. It may be that the *Lan*-name contains the name of the *donor* of the property. It is necessary to tabulate all the *Lan*-names and give the dedications, and this would mean a lengthy article in itself, and might not lead to decisive results. One day the clue to the difficulty may be discovered."

P. 27, line 27. Read "*Ecclas Choluim Chille* at Kells and the Scottish *Eglismaly* (1611) 'Maillidh's Church.' " At the end of the paragraph add: Further Cornish names with *Eglos* given me by Canon Doble from the collections of the late Charles Henderson are *Eglosallen* (St. Allen), *Eglosberian* (St. Beriana; now Buryan), *Eglosbreoke* (St. Breock), *Eglosbudockvean* (St. Budock), *Egloscubert* (St. Cubert), *Egloskerry* (St. Keria), *Eglosenoder* (St. Enoder), *Egloserme* (St. Erme, or Hermes), *Egloslagek* (St. Ladoca), *Eglosmadern* (St. Madernus or Paternus; now Madron), *Eglosneulin* (St. Neulina), *Eglostudic* (St. Tudy), *Egloswendron* (St. Wendron), etc. (Cf. also Henderson, in *Cornish Church Guide,* Truro, 1925, s. vv.)

To Fr. Harris I am indebted for a long list of Welsh church-names in *Eglwys.* Indicating still existing parishes by *, and omitting such obviously late dedications and purely descriptive names as *Eglwys Fair, Eglwys y Drindod,* and *Eglwys Ifan* (to the Blessed Virgin, the Holy Trinity, and St. John), or *Hen Eglwys* and *Eglwys y Bedd* ("Old Church," "Tomb-Church"), I may here cite **Eglwys Brewis, Eglwys Nunyd* (Glamorganshire); **Eglwys Gain* (or *Llangain* or *Maenor Gain*), **Eglwys Cymin, *Eglwys Wrw, Eglwys Wynio* (Pembrokeshire); **Eglwys Dyneio* (now Pwllheli, Carnarvonshire); *Eglwys Dudor* (Merionethshire).

I should have added the names in Welsh *Merthyr,* Cornish *Merther* (from Latin *martyrium,* properly "martyrdom," then "place of martyrdom, church" perhaps "relics, churchyard"; the Irish and Breton *martir* and *merzer* do not occur in church-names), and Welsh *Llech,* "stone" (Irish *lecc,* Cornish *lech,* and Breton *lec'h* are not found in church-dedications). A list of *Merthyr*-names at least fairly complete is

given in Wade-Evans's *Life of St. David* (pp. 92-93), to which Fr. Harris has added the modern designations. Of these, special mention may be made of such as show modern names in *Llan*: **Merthyr Ilan* (now *Eglwys Ilan*; Glamorganshire), **Merthyr Dingad* (now *Llandingad* or *Dingestow*), **Merthyr Maches* (now *Llanfaches*), **Merthyr Tegfedd* (now *Llandegfedd*; all three in Monmouthshire), **Merthyr Celer* (now *Llangeler*; Cardiganshire), and **Merthyr Caffo* (now *Llangaffo*; Anglesey). Cornwall has *Merther Uny* (corrupted into *Marooney*), *Merther Sithney* (corrupted into *Marsinney*), *Merther Mylor* (corrupted into *Barry Mylor*), and *Merther Anou* (corrupted into *Mathiana*; see *CSS* 11[2], 9, 34-36). As Fr. Harris writes (July 17, 1943), *Eglwys*-dedications "with the name of the Saint are, I think, much later than names either in *Merthyr* or *Llan*. . . . In cases where they embody the names of native Saints the name in *Eglwys* seems to have displaced an older designation."

While only two *Llech*-names (both in Anglesey) seem to be known, *Llechgynfarwy* ("Stone of St. Cynfarwy") and *Llechulched* ("Stone of St. Ulched"), the meaning of the word is of interest. I myself had thought of *Llech* as denoting a cross erected by the Saint or a memorial standing-stone, seeking a parallel for the latter in the numerous Irish names in *Lecc* (Hogan, pp. 477[b]-479[a]); but Fr. Harris writes: "The more exact meaning of *Llech* is a *flat* stone or slab, so that I should hardly think it could connote the stone cross set up by the Saint. But it might conceivably stand for the portable altar of the Saint, and so could possibly be brought into comparison with the Cornish *Altarnon*, or, alternatively, might indicate a flat memorial stone associated with the Saint."

Mere mention will suffice for a few sporadic terms, such as Welsh *Maenor* "manor" (e.g., *Maenor Gain*, an alternative of *Eglwys Gain* and *Llangain*; *Maenor Mathru*, the ancient name of **Mathry*; *Maenor Wynno* [St. Gwynno]; *Maenor Dewi* [St. David]); Breton *Peniti* (from Latin **poenitio* "penance" [?]; *Penity-Saint-Briac*, *Peniti-Sant-Sezni*; cf. Largillière, p. 232; Loth, *Les Mots latins dans les langues brittoniques*, Paris, 1892, p. 194[b]); and *Menehi* or *Minihi* (Modern Breton *menec'hi* from Medieval Latin *monachia*, "cell dependent on an abbey"; *Minihi Briac* in Brittany and *Menheniot* ["Minihi of St. Neot"] in Cornwall; Largillière, *loc. cit.*; *Cornish Church Guide*, p. 157).

P. 30, note 84, line 6. Add a comma at the end of the line.

CONCERNING BERGSON'S RELATION TO THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

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HERE ARE SOME FACTS about the religious ideas of Henri Bergson toward the end of his life. I quote first from a book entitled *Henri Bergson,* published by Albert Béguin and Pierre Thévenaz (Neuchatel, 1942), pages 11 and 12. These two pages are themselves made up of quotations:

La Gazette de Lausanne (September 9, 1941) has reproduced a letter of Mme. Henri Bergson to M. Emmanuel Mounier, which puts an end to the discussion. Here are the essential parts of this Letter:

"My husband, who for a long time had been very deeply interested in religious questions, and who, particularly since the publication of *The Two Sources* (1932), had felt a growing sympathy for Catholicism, had decided, however, not to become a convert, for various reasons which some of his intimate friends with whom he had discussed the matter quite openly had heard with appreciation and approval. More important still, he has given an account of all this with great clarity in a passage of his will, dated February 8, 1937. Here is this passage:

" 'My reflections have led me nearer and nearer to Catholicism, in which I find the absolute completion of Judaism. I would have become a convert if I had not seen in preparation for so many years this formidable wave of anti-Semitism which will soon overflow the world. I wanted to remain among those who tomorrow will be the persecuted ones. But I hope that a Catholic priest will be willing, if the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris gives him the authorization, to come and say the prayers at my burial. If this authorization is not given, a rabbi should be asked, but without hiding from him, or from anyone, my moral adherence to Catholicism, as well as the desire, before stated, of having the prayers of a Catholic priest.'

"The decision of Henri Bergson (continues Mme. Bergson's letter) which was very firm, can be interpreted in only one way, and leaves no possibility of ambiguity. At the same time as he declared his moral adherence to Catholicism, my husband had resolved not to take the decisive step of baptism. It would be quite unbecoming, considering the complete loyalty which he has always shown in the search for what he considered truth, to attribute to him acts which he had not been willing to commit when he was alive, and to deflect his thought (now that he is no longer here to put things straight again, and to defend himself) in a direction which, whatever may be the motive involved, is a complete distortion of it."

To this the editors of the book add:

The new literary magazine of Lyons, *Confluences,* in its second issue (August, 1941), quotes this fragment of a letter of Jean Wahl:
"On his deathbed Bergson has had a priest called (a Catholic priest); when the priest arrived Bergson was dead; the priest recited the prayers for the dead; Bergson was not baptized; there has been no religious burial."

Albert Béguin and Pierre Thévenaz add the following:

This will put an end to the discussion concerning the baptism of Bergson, a discussion which has been entered into on both sides with too hasty ardor. It remains that Bergson was not baptized, but that he had reached the point of adherence to the Christian truth. We believe that every Christian will subscribe to the conclusions of R. P. Sertillanges (*Avec Henri Bergson,* Paris, 1941): "What is sure is that the prayer of the Church has not been absent from his tomb, and we know that there is a baptism of desire. I have no doubt that God has this soul."

May I myself add a number of comments on these testimonies?

"My husband, who for a long time had been very deeply interested in religious questions" (Mme. Bergson): This question had, in fact, loomed large in his thought for a very long time. His reflections on mind as independent of matter might have led him to it, but he came to it in particular by way of the study of mysticism. When I saw him for the first time in his home, in 1910, he was already reading Madame Guyon. For, strange to say, it was, at least in part, by the study of this very unorthodox mystic of the seventeenth century that he came to the study of mysticism, and to religion in general. Probably some rather superficial resemblances between Mme. Guyon's *Les Torrents* and his own conception of the flux of consciousness had been pointed out to him. From Mme. Guyon he went to St. Theresa of Avila. He did not know the Protestant mystics very well, though he told me that the book by Evelyn Underhill (which contains many quotations from Protestant mystics) was the best book he knew on mysticism. (This was said during the first World War, or a little before.) And still less did he know the Oriental and Jewish forms of mysticism.

When I questioned him (probably a little after 1925) about a capital letter with which he had written *Celui* (He), speaking of Jesus, in a letter to *Le Temps,* he said:

Do you think that one can speak of him as of any other man? (or "as of a man"—I don't remember which). There was, at that moment, something which came into humanity from outside humanity, and from above humanity. I have come to realize that from the reading of the mystics. Such a beautiful movement, the greatest movement in mankind, cannot come but from a divine principle.

For Bergson the ideas of Love and Person were stronger in Christian mysticism than in any other.

A second reason, which he gave me afterwards, for the admiration he felt for Christianity was the profound unity of Christianity with ethics. The conversation dates from some years after 1933: "Hitler is the proof of what I said in *The Two Sources*. He has proved that whoever is against Christianity is against morals, and whoever is against morals is against Christianity." Twice he told me that, in almost the same terms.

"Catholicism": note that Mme. Bergson says "Catholicism." I think that in his conversations about it, Bergson formerly used the term "Christianism," but in his will he says definitely that Catholicism is the completion of Judaism.

"For various reasons": perhaps one of these reasons, which may be added to the one given by him and by Mme. Bergson, could be found in all the vexations which some of his friends and admirers (such as Père Laberthonnière and Professor Edouard LeRoy) had to suffer from the Church, some of their books, as well as his own, having been condemned by the papacy. He referred once before me to the misfortunes of Père Laberthonnière. Perhaps he thought it better, therefore, in the best interest of his own thought, as well as in the interest of the Church itself, not to become a member, although adhering to it in spirit.

Moreover, I remember his asking me this question (it was shortly after he had learned that my friend, Gabriel Marcel, a philosopher, but not at all a Thomistic philosopher, had been converted to Catholicism): "But must not a Catholic be a Thomist?" (A rather astonishing question, and especially to be asked of me.) I replied that Thomism was recommended, but was not at all a necessary condition for being a Catholic. But Bergson was not quite sure.

"The absolute completion of Judaism": this was already Bergson's idea in *The Two Sources*.

"Anti-Semitism": this passage may be completed by other passages in

Bergson's will which have been reproduced in the *Revue philosophique* (Paris, 1941).

"A rabbi": note that he does not mention the possibility of asking for a Protestant minister, although one could maintain that Protestantism is nearer to the open society described in *The Two Sources* than either Catholicism or Judaism.

"Moral adherence": the term means that the material adherence was absent, rather than implying a degree of probability.

"The decisive step": it is of some interest, perhaps, to recall that, after my conversation with Mme. Bergson, I had occasion to ask a priest and a Catholic professor in the College de France what they thought of this moral adherence. The priest said that there is nothing so decisive in the single act of baptism, and contended that Bergson was really a Christian. The professor, a layman, thought that baptism, with its intellectually "scandalous" character of valuing the influence of a material act upon the soul itself, is strictly necessary.

"To attribute to him acts": it was from the United States that the rumor of Bergson's baptism came, as an article from an American paper had been republished in the *Gazette de Lausanne*. Thus the legend seems to have come to Paris from the United States via Switzerland.

"Bergson on his deathbed": I here reproduce other passages of this same issue of *Confluences* (August, 1941). Marc Barbezat writes:

> Jean Wahl will excuse me if I quote here what he wrote to me on this subject:
>
> "Henri Bergson was very near, extremely near Catholicism. But the imperious reasons which, in his mind, were an obstacle to baptism, existed more than ever in this last year of his life. He frequently advised those who wished to know his thought to turn to *The Two Sources*."

These words were written by me immediately after a conversation with Mme. Bergson, and at the same time, in an article in the volume I have mentioned, I wrote: "He had with him, to guide him, the thought of the mystics, and the thought of the books of the prophets, the thought of the God of Jesus, of Jesus who was for him God, whom, outside any church, he acknowledged and adored." It is true that he was outside of the Church, but I ought to have added (what I knew only afterwards) that he wanted the Church to be beside him.

But there is still a problem: in his will Bergson asks for prayers at his

tomb, and then it appears that a priest was called to his deathbed at the request of Mme. Bergson. A devoted and close friend of Bergson, Professor Floris Delattre, of the Sorbonne, told me that Mme. Bergson, in accordance with what she thought were her husband's wishes, had asked for a priest at the deathbed, (not one who had been a personal friend of Bergson; she had requested the Archbishop to designate a priest of the parish in which they lived). She also seems to have considered the idea of a Catholic burial, but, as Bergson was not baptized, the parish priest refused to permit it.

On the other hand, Père Sertillanges (in the book edited by Béguin and Thévenaz), after having praised Bergson's anti-relativism, and criticised his evolutionism and his anti-intellectualism, says, in terms which seem very carefully weighed:

> The evolution of his thought on this point had been so radical that he felt the need of union, not only with Christ and the saints, but with the Church. He had the intention of adding a paragraph to this effect in *The Two Sources*. I have been told only afterwards, only indirectly, that he had decided at that moment (after the conversations with Sertillanges in December, 1940) to be baptised. Once he had designated the priest who was to administer baptism, and had refused this baptism only for temporary reasons in which the delicacy of his heart shows itself.

Now that we know the will of 1937, the reasons do not appear so temporary. But we realize that in the last weeks of his life (I did not see him after the eleventh of November, and he died in the first days of January) he had undergone the stress of the tragic situation of his country and the world, and sought more and more the help of the Catholic religion.

All this being said, must we say further, with Père Sertillanges, that "this fact (the fact that he had reached the borders of Catholic faith and the thought of baptism) possesses an apologetic value comparable to one based on affirmations and proofs, and which is even superior, since life weighs more than thought?" Or must we say only that, under the multiple motivations—mystical, ethical, and perhaps national—Bergson, the man, had thought thus, and had not found in the thought of Bergson, the philosopher, anything to the contrary, and had, in consequence, aimed more and more towards an act which appeared to him

an act of reconciliation, of union?[1] But circumstances—or was it God, or was it Fate?—did not allow him to accomplish it, but only to aim at it. Certainly he came as near as possible to it.

1. I should like to quote one other opinion on this question, from an article by Léon Brunschvicg in the same book, *Henri Bergson,* edited by Béguin and Thévenaz: "The one necessary thing, in order to understand, is to love, cultivate, and foster in ourselves Bergson's thought, without trying to enclose him and his work—a real duration made of heterogeneous moments—in any systematic formula whatever, and without any idea of utilizing him for any exterior end."

BOOK REVIEWS

Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research, Vol. XIII, 1943. New York: The American Academy for Jewish Research, 1943. XXVI, 96 pp. $2.00.

For students of religion the main interest of this volume will lie in Dr. Solomon Gandz's study of "The Zodiacal Light in Semitic Mythology." The author seeks to prove that the ancient Semites (and Egyptians) recognized that curious cone of light which appears in the eastern sky just before dawn and in the western sky just after dusk, and that several figures of their pantheon, usually explained on other lines, are really to be understood as deifications of this phenomenon.

For all of its ingenuity, it is the opinion of this reviewer that Dr. Gandz has not made out his case. On general grounds the following objections at once arise:

(1) If the zodiacal light were so commonly recognized, why is it nowhere explicitly mentioned in ancient Semitic literature—not even in the many Babylonian and Assyrian astronomical texts?

(2) Why does it not figure among the heavenly lights in the Babylonian and Hebrew accounts of creation (*Enuma Elish,* VI and Genesis 1:14-18)?

(3) Why is it not included in the Asshur text, VAT. 10173, col. v, 1-6 (= O. Schroeder, *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie* 1921, p. 133) which lists such other deified celestial phenomena as e.g., the dawn (^{d}Sêrum), the rainbow (^{d}TIR.AN.NA; Semitic *marratu*), etc.?

(4) What proof is there that the Semites normally regarded the recurrent zodiacal light of the morning and evening as *two distinct phenomena,* such as would justify Dr. Gandz's assumption that it was deified in the form of *twin* gods or of gods said to possess *two* horns (e.g., the Arabic Dhu-l-Qarnain)?

On specific grounds, it may be objected that Dr. Gandz's thesis depends very largely upon an eclectic treatment of mythological data and an even more cavalier attitude towards Semitic philology—faults which invalidate every one of his proposed identifications.

We may start with those cases in which Dr. Gandz would equate familiar divine pairs with deifications of the zodiacal light. Thus, the Babylonian *Kettu* and *Mesharu* (Equity and Right) are so regarded because they are invariably associated with Shamash, the sun-god. Here

Dr. Gandz forgets that Shamash, besides being the sun, was also the god of justice who presided over legal tribunals. It is obviously in this aspect that the personified Equity and Right—possibly projected from the two assessors at court—are brought into relationship with him. Similarly, the theory that the analogous Phoenician *Zuduq* (Right) and *Misor* (Equity, Uprightness) represent the *upright* cone of the zodiacal light ignores the fact that these gods are said to have discovered salt—a mythological tidbit which at once betrays their original character as gods of justice invoked in concluding the well-known "covenant of salt." Equally untenable is the view that the Canaanite *Shaḥru* and *Shalmu* (Dawn and Sunset) of the Ras Shamra texts represent the morning and evening zodiacal light. The root of the latter name means properly "to come to and end"; accordingly, while it is perfectly intelligible as denoting the *setting* sun, it is difficult to see how it could be applied to a cone of light which *rises* after dusk.

Scarcely more fortunate are Dr. Gandz's attempts to identify other members of the ancient Semitic pantheon with the zodiacal light. Thus, when he seeks to equate the Babylonian *Ishtar* with this phenomenon, on the grounds that she is associated with Shamash, the sun-god, and Sin, the moon-god, he comes up against the objection that this triad is purely schematic, and that, in other early Mesopotamian sources, Ishtar is associated equally with Adad and Sin, or even with Marduk and Sin. Moreover, the farther back we go the more it is apparent that Ishtar was originally associated with fertility and fecundity, rather than with celestial phenomena. Her later identification with the planet Venus—though this appears already in Sumerian sources—has no bearing whatsoever upon the theory that she originally represented the zodiacal light. If Dr. Gandz would still press the association of Ishtar with Shamash and Sin as evidence of his contention, he may be reminded that, in the analogous South Arabian system, 'Athtar (Venus), the third member of the trinity, sometimes alternates with Ḥaul (Mercury) or Nkrḥ (Saturn), showing that a *planet* is indicated.

Still more bizarre is our author's attempt to identify the obscure Arabic *Dhū-l-Qarnain* ("He of the two horns")—usually equated with Alexander the Great or some earthly conqueror—with the zodiacal light. As evidence of this identification Dr. Gandz offers certain verses from a poem by Ḥassān ibn Thābit, a contemporary of Muḥammad (A.D. 570-632). But what do these verses actually say? In terms analogous

to a famous passage in the Koran (XVIII, 82-98), they describe how Dhū-l-Qarnain strides across the earth, following the sun from its rising to its setting, and how he has imprisoned the rebellious Gog and Magog behind a wall of iron. Now, the very introduction of this last detail—which Dr. Gandz dismisses as "a new historical or geographical element" (p. 4)—shows quite clearly that the passage refers to Alexander, or at least to some earthly monarch, for the legend which told how the Macedonian incarcerated Gog and Mog in a region near the Caspian, or in Azerbaijan, was a commonplace of folklore (see A. R. Anderson, *Alexander's Gate, Gog and Magog and the Enclosed Nations* [Cambridge, Mass., 1932]; cf. also, Muqqadasi, ed. de Goeje, p. 20; *Chronicles of Jerahmeel,* ed. M. Gaster, xxi, 4; J. G. Taylor, *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society,* XXXV [1865] 42; W. Belck, *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* [1899], p. 251; R. Hartmann, ZDMG [1913], pp. 748-50; A. H. Krappe, *Philological Quarterly* [1941], pp. 126-27; [1942], p. 341). Hence it is quite arbitrary to refer the poet's lines to the zodiacal light. Indeed, by the same line of argument, the description of the beloved in Song of Songs, 6:10 ("Who is this that looketh forth like the dawn?") could be resolved into a hymn to the zodiacal light!

A major point in Dr. Gandz's thesis is that the two horns attributed to such deities as *'Ashtoreth Qarnaim, Dhū-l-Qarnaim,* and the Egyptian *Sopdu 'b.wy* represent the morning and evening cones of the zodiacal light. This, however, is extremely doubtful. In the first place, we have to remember that figurines of Astarte (or an analogous goddess) wearing *animal* horns have actually been found in Palestine (see James B. Pritchard, *Palestinian Figurines in relation to Certain Goddesses known through Literature* [New Haven, 1943]), and that the horn of 'Anat is expressly mentioned in a Ras Shamra text (IV, AB, ii, 21-22), where she is somehow associated with a wild cow. Then, too, we must bear in mind that the crescents of the moon were known both to the Babylonians and to the Canaanites as "horns" (cf. II R. 58, 35a; *qaran imittišu*; III, Aqhat, i, 10: *qrn ymnh*) and that Baal is portrayed as Ras Shamra with a horn, and seemingly addressed in one passage (RS. VI, 23) as a "wild bull" (*arḫ*; cf. Akkadian *arḫu*). It is, therefore, by no means certain that the horns associated with gods and goddesses necessarily represent the zodiacal cone. As for the contention that the Egyptian *Śpd 'b.wy* ("Sopdu of the two horns")—which Dr. Gandz transliterates, in antiquated fashion, *Sepṭ Ābui*—was a god of the zodia-

cal light, the argument rests on the fact that his name is often written with signs representing a cone followed by two horns. But this may be mere rhebus writing, the foreign name Sopdu being assimilated orthographically to the Egyptian word *spd,* "thorn," which was written with the sign of the pointed triangle. The two horns need not represent the zodiacal pyramids. Moreover, Dr. Gandz will have to account for the fact that Sopdu was originally the falcon-god of the XXth nome of Lower Egypt, and that his name is alternatively written with the sign of the falcon surmounted by the twin plumes.

The philological arguments by which Dr. Gandz supports his thesis are uniformally wrong. No competent philologist will agree, for instance, that the names 'Athtart and 'Ashtareth can be derived from the Arabic root *'atara,* "be hard, strong." If the name is indeed Semitic, it must derive from a root *'-th-r,* whatever the meaning may be. Similarly, it is impossible to connect Asherah with *y-sh-r,* "be straight, erect," in view of the Ugaritic and South Arabian spelling *A-th-r-t.* Nor can the Phoenician Mishor be explained as denoting properly the *upright* cone of the zodiacal light, since the root *y-sh-r* means "to be straight, level," not "to be upright" (cf. Hebrew *mishor,* "plain"). The latter is *z-q-p.*

It is to be feared, also, that Dr. Gandz's obvious enthusiasm sometimes leads him into extravagances. Typical of this are his efforts to detect the divine names Zedeq and Shalom in sundry passages of the Bible where the usual meanings, "righteousness" and "peace," obviously provide the better sense. Thus, the attempt to interpret the words of Psalm 4:2, "Answer me when I cry, O god of my right (*zidqi*)" as "Answer me when I call, O my god Zedeq" ignores the fact that the poem in question belongs to the class of "asylum-psalms," i.e., supplications uttered by persons seeking refuge at a sanctuary from vendettas, blood-feuds, etc. In such psalms, an appeal to the local deity as the *vindicator* of his "client" is surely appropriate. (Besides, the construction "O my god Zedeq" is un-Hebraic; normal usage would require "O Zedeq my God.") Similarly, the attempt to find Zedeq and Mishor in Psalm 45:4, 7 is peculiarly unfortunate. The words *w'anwah zedeq* in the former verse cannot possible mean "in the strength of Zedeq"; this would require at least *w'anwath zedeq,* and there is no good authority for rendering the Arabic *'anwa* and *'unwa* by "might." (Perhaps we should read *we'oni hazdeq,* "and vindicate the oppressed," as suggested by

Melville Scott.) In v. 7, "Thy throne is a throne divine, lasting for ever and ever; a sceptre of *mishor* is the sceptre of thy kingship", Dr. Gandz's attempt to find an allusion to the sceptre of the god Mishor ignores such a good Akkadian parallel as *ḫaṭṭu išarti kussu dâru,* "a sceptre of righteousness, an enduring throne" in e.g., Harper, *Letters,* 117:4; 350:5-6; and K. 562:5 (= S. A. Smith, *Die Keilschrifttexte Asurbanipals* [Leipzig, 1887], II, 36). Lastly, we come to Dr. Gandz's interpretation of Habakkuk 3:3-6, which he reads as a description of the theophany of a solar god accompanied by the twin deities of the morning and evening zodiacal light. For this there is absolutely no authority. To render the Hebrew *nōgah* (dayspring) in verse 4 as "the light-pyramid of the dawn" is a *petitio principii,* and there is no reason whatsoever why Deber and Resheph (Plague and Pestilence), said to walk before Yahweh, should be the morning and evening cones. The latter deity is well-known from Palestinian and other sources as a god of pestilence, and is equated on Cypriote bilingual inscriptions with Apollo. Moreover, the statement that they "go before" Yahweh is admirably paralleled in the Babylonian description of the flood: "At break of dawn, when it grows light, there rises from the bottom of the sky a black cloud; Adad in the midst of it thunders; Nabu and Sharru *go in front*; they go as pursuivants (*guzalê*) over mountain and land" (*Gilgamesh Epic,* XII, ii, 37).

All in all, therefore, the assertion that, despite his manifest ingenuity and erudition, Dr. Gandz has not proved his case, appears to be justified.

Other articles in this volume, of less interest to students of religion, are Dr. D. de Sola Pool's paper on "The Constructive Use of *kol* in the Book of Psalms," and Professor Leo Strauss's discussion of the Law of Reason as treated in the *Kuzari* of Judah Ha-Levi. Dr. Pool contends that in many passages of the Psalter the Hebrew word *kol,* "all," is used not adjectivally but adverbially, in the sense of "altogether, completely." Thus, the expression, "I will relate *all* Thy wonders," in Ps. 9:2, means simply "I will altogether relate Thy wonders." Dr. Pool might have supported his argument by reference to the analogous Akkadian use of *gabbišu, gimrišunu,* etc. in poetic texts, as well as to a similar Aramaic idiom in Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri,* 82:60-1 (first pointed out by G. R. Driver, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* 1932, p. 88).

But one wonders whether, if Dr. Pool is right, the word should not be vocalized as an *absolute* form and derived from an archaic adverbial accusative.

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Saadia Anniversary Volume (*Texts and Studies,* Vol. II). New York: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1943. 346 pp.

Rab Saadia Gaon: Studies in His Honor. Edited by LOUIS FINKELSTEIN. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1944. x, 191 pp. $1.75.

The year 1942 marked the thousandth anniversary of the death of Rabbi Saadia ben Joseph, the renowned head of the Talmudic Academy of Sura, Babylonia. A highly original thinker and scholar, he was the founder of systematic Jewish religious philosophy.

The first modern biography of Saadia was presented by R. J. Rapoport, in 1828. In 1892, the Genizah, a vast treasure of Hebrew and Arabic manuscripts, was discovered in the old Cairo synagogue, which largely enriched our knowledge of the gaonic era and, with it, our understanding of Saadia. The Genizah material was utilized by Henry Malter, whose comprehensive work on Saadia appeared in 1921.

The volume published by the American Academy for Jewish Research, comprises eight essays discussing certain phases in Saadia's life, his activities, and literary work, and presents instances of the influence of his teachings.

The volume opens with a brilliantly written article by Salo W. Baron, who reviews the life and works of Saadia from the angle of "Communal Activities." Professor Baron's profound sense of history in searching the political and economical background for the understanding of a personality becomes evident again in the present essay. According to Baron, the great task which Saadia had set himself was the reunification of eastern Jewry. This endeavor is examined as a parallel to the history of the Caliphate of that period. It was during the first part of Saadia's life that the Caliphate succeeded in reconquering Egypt, and in re-establishing a united empire from the Nile to the borders of India. Baron suggests that Saadia's reaction to this trend toward reunifying the Empire was his polemic against Anan, the founder of Karaism, a heterodox Jewish sect. By this action Saadia intended to

control that dissenting movement which, to a certain extent, was favored by the Egyptian rulers, and to secure Bagdad as the center of leadership in Jewry.

In 921-22 this leadership was defied by Ben Meir, who used Palestine's ancient prerogative of regulating the Jewish calendar to reinstate Palestinian hegemony in that respect. Baron gives an ingenious description of the intervention of Saadia, who had not yet attained official authority. Prompted by his passion for the historic rule of Babylonian Jewry, he succeeded in uniting its leaders in a determined opposition to Ben Meir. The growing disintegration of the Caliphate—partly due to the eastward expansion of the Christian Byzantium—favored the Palestinian claims. But the Babylonian center of Jewry, once united, emerged from this controversy greatly strengthened.

In Saadia's activity as Gaon (head of the Academy) of Sura, Baron finds indication of instances of communal aspect. Saadia's connections with Jewish court bankers, his extensive travels, and his renewed contact with his native Egypt were utilized to strengthen the authority of the Babylonian leadership in the face of growing tendencies of decline. Saadia's conceptions of the authority of the scholar, of prophecy, and some of his legal ordinances, especially his genealogical claims, are interpreted by Baron in connection with Saadia's bid for supreme leadership on Israel. The ensuing conflict between Saadia and the exilarch David b. Zakkai, hitherto considered by scholars who vindicated Saadia, is re-examined by Baron, who makes it evident that Saadia played a political game in antagonizing the vigorous personality of his opponent. The latter is shown by Baron to have been encouraged by the prevailing conditions in court circles. Even in Saadia's scientific work Baron detects the communal aspect. Saadia's philological treatises are interpreted as attempts to strengthen the use of the Hebrew language as a link in Jewish unity. In his polemics against Ḥiwi-al-Balkhi, whose radical rationalist Bible criticism found its way into the Jewish school system, Saadia is shown addressing himself to communal leaders. The chapters on ethics in his main religio-philosophic book bear the imprint of controversy directed against the communal policy of the exilarch. Saadia's promulgation of an official prayer book was designed to unite the different congregations into a uniform Jewry. But Saadia did not achieve the reunification of eastern Jewry, and in the failure of his plans the breakdown of the Caliphate empire was reflected.

Only a few fragments of Saadia's Arabic commentary on the Bible are extant, but the quotations and extracts from this commentary found in later authors are an important additional source for our knowledge of Saadia's biblical interpretation. In the present volume Boaz Cohen has very ably edited forty Saadianic passages (not previously printed) from two manuscripts of Abraham ben Solomon, a Yemenite author of the fourteenth century. A Hebrew translation of the texts accompanies the edition, which is preceded by an excellent concise summary of the characteristic motives and problems in Saadia's comments on Scripture.

Solomon Gandz, in his article, "Saadia Gaon as Mathematician," examines Saadia's writings as to the scope of the latter's interest and knowledge in the different branches of mathematics. Arithmetical calculations appear to have been a favorite pastime of the Gaon, who often interrupts legal and theological discussions in order to indulge in lengthy computations.

A remarkable contribution is Harry Austryn Wolfson's "The Kalam Arguments for Creation in Saadia, Averroes, Maimonides and St. Thomas." With great erudition and clarity Professor Wolfson discusses nine proofs produced by the Kalam to establish the creation of the world or to refute its eternity. The proofs are: from Finitude, from Composition, from Accidents, from Time or the Generations of Man, from the Revolutions of the Celestial Bodies, from Immortal Souls, from Analogy, from Determination, from Preference. Wolfson explains the meaning of these proofs and traces their origin and literary sources in Greek philosophy, examining their logical structure and the different versions of the arguments directed, in most cases, against Aristotole, and tests the validity of the arguments. The Kalam proofs for the creation of the world have an interesting history. They reached posterity not through writings of the Kalam but through the works of intermediaries, especially Saadia, Bahya, Yehuda Hallevi, Averroes, and Maimonides. Through these channels they became known to St. Thomas, who, together with the Hebrew writings, became the source of these proofs for Spinoza and Kant. By singling out one problem for a thorough analysis, Wolfson, the broadminded and thorough historian of philosophy, demonstrates the growth of a medieval philosophical conception and its place in modern philosophical discussion.

Saadia's Siddur, the oldest extant Hebrew prayer book, had been al-

most forgotten for many centuries. In 851 it was rediscovered by Steinschneider, and the subsequent discovery of the Genizah greatly augmented the original manuscript. The late historian, Ismar Elbogen, in his article, "Saadia's Siddur," relates the fascinating story of its publication (in 1941) and gives an outline of this work which, in its order of prayer and accompanying commentary, portrays the customary Jewish liturgy of a thousand years ago.

This article is followed by a valuable paper by Michael Higger, "Saadia and the Treatise Soferim," in which some of the differences between the Palestinian and the Babylonian Jewish laws, mainly of liturgical nature, are discussed—a subject which the author has treated extensively in the introduction to his edition of the Treatise Soferim.

The influence of Saadia on the biblical and philosophical studies of the Samaritans is discussed by A. S. Halkin, who has previously investigated the subject of Samaritan polemics against the Jews. Dr. Halkin revises the theory of the Kahle school which assumed that the Samaritans first adopted Saadia's Arabic translation of the Bible, the divergences in the Samaritan version being later modifications of Saadia's original. Halkin suggests that, with the spread of Arabic among the Samaritans, the traditional Samaritan interpretation was rendered into Arabic and orally preserved. Saadia's translation, which became known to the Samaritans about 950, furnished the impetus under which they began to *writè* their own interpretations. The Samaritan tradition was the base to which Saadia's version was adapted. Abu Sa'īd, considered by some to be the author of the Samaritan version, was, according to Halkin, actually the revisor of the current rendering, altering passages according to Samaritan theological conceptions but otherwise leaving borrowings from Saadia unchanged. His editing brought forth the Textus Receptus for the Samaritan Arabic Pentateuch.

Halkin points to the extent of possible borrowings from Saadia who, through different channels (e.g., Abu-l-Ḥasan al-Sūri's Ṭabakh), entered Samaritan tradition, thus influencing the work of Abu-Sa'īd. Among many divergences between Saadia and Abu-Sa'īd, Halkin mentions only those instances in which Saadia is explicitly quoted. In a very thorough comparative study (pp. 297 ff.), Halkin attempts to describe Saadia's contribution to some problems of Samaritan theology: for example, he recognizes borrowings from Saadia, or at least significant parallels between Samaritan writers and the Gaon in the Samari-

tan inclusion of inadmissible attributes under the Aristotelian categories (p. 304): in the emphasis on the importance of tradition in the recognition of the sources of revealed Law (p. 315), and in dealing with the problem of the "abrogation of the law" (p. 317).

The distinguished bibliographer and historian, Professor Aron Freimann, concludes this volume with a general survey of the publications on Saadia that had appeared since the completion of Henry Malter's Saadia biography.

As profound and extensive as this book is, it had to be limited to a number of significant studies. It is hardly possible for a collection of this kind to offer a complete view of the subject. Thus various issues essential for the understanding of Saadia were not dealt with, such as the character of Saadia's theology, the literary disposition of his magnum opus, and his relation to the intellectual movements of his time. Regret at these almost unavoidable limitations, however, in no way diminishes our appreciation of the high value of this publication.

The Saadia Studies, edited by Louis Finkelstein, constitute a collection of papers read before assemblies in honor of Saadia at the Jewish Theological Seminary, or under its auspices.

An impressive foreword by the editor expounds the significance of Saadia for Western civilization. In modern life, its emphasis on technique and its enjoyment of the "process" in and for itself, as opposed to the prophetic and philosophical standard of conduct which is determined by a definite aim, Professor Finkelstein finds the reappearance of the primitive, pagan concept of life as play. The active contradiction between pagan and monotheistic elements in our world prevent the emergence of Western culture as an organism. Finkelstein therefore, recognizes as the basic need of Western culture the continuation of the work of the Jewish and Christian teachers of the first century and of the Moslem Christian and Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages who achieved an effective integration of the prophetic and philosophical elements in Western culture. Finkelstein presents Saadia as an exponent of a successful synthesis of Hellenic and Hebraic strands of thought. This synthesis the author illustrates by a few beautiful examples of prayers composed by Saadia. In Saadia's recognition of the identity of ultimate wisdom and true saintliness lies, according to Finkelstein, his foremost qualification for the task of combining religious and philo-

sophical ideals into harmonious relationship. A similar integration today would enable us to overcome the impediments of the development of our Western civilization and to progress towards the creation of a "global civilization" (p. 47). The essay is a noble attempt to see Saadia's work in the perspective of Western civilization and of our present-day problems. However, the exceedingly wide-stretched frame of the article necessitates a simplification of the entire problem of modern civilization, preventing the author from analysing in detail any one single issue involved.

Professor Alexander Marx contributes a life story of Saadia written with great skill and acumen, a reconstruction based on the documents discovered in the Genizah and on the accounts of contemporaries, the Gaon Sherira and Nathan ha-Kohen. This outline is followed by a brief and competent evaluation of Saadia's literary production.

The papers by Richard P. McKeon and Arthur H. Compton were originally presented at a Saadia celebration in the University of Chicago. Professor McKeon offers a remarkable inquiry into Saadia's place in the "age-long search of man for the means by which to bring wisdom to the control of his actions." Professor Compton, taking Saadia's discussion of man's moral responsibility for his starting point, examines the problem of freedom in modern philosophy and science.

A. S. Halkin, in an outstanding essay, "Saadia's Exegesis and Polemics," gives a brief sketch of the cultural background of the Eastern world in the tenth century, a period in which Judaism experienced a transition from a comparatively confined religion to a civilization strongly influenced by secular learning. The author then discusses the dual reaction of Saadia to his environment: the adaptation of his beliefs to the rational philosophic standards of his time, and his refutation of heretical views. Halkin deals with the exegetical methods applied by Saadia, who saw in the Bible a rational book, "a repository of philosophic and scientific truth" (p. 131). That such an understanding implies, to some extent, an apologetic trend, is properly indicated by the author. Saadia's polemics against disruptive trends carried on in the biblical commentaries and in special "Refutations" are characterized by Halkin with a superb objectivity. The polemical background of the Emunot we-Deot, however, is only mentioned in passing.

The papers by Ben Zion Bokser and Robert Gordis are lucid attempts to present the personality of Saadia and his ideas on more gen-

eral lines. Appendices to the volume bring, among other things, a selected bibliography of Saadia arranged by Boaz Cohen.

Some readers may question the usefulness of a combination of scholarly articles and essays of a more popular appeal, no matter how meritorious they might be. This book nevertheless, besides offering new interesting reflections on Saadia, is a distinct step towards a better understanding of the correlation of theological ideas in the medieval world.

NAHUM N. GLATZER

Boston Hebrew Teachers College

Jordani de Saxonia, Liber Vitasfratrum. Ed. by RUDOLPHUS ARBESMANN, O.S.A. and WINFRIDUS HÜMPNER, O.S.A. New York: Cosmopolitan Science and Art Service Co., Inc., 1943. xcii, 548 pp. Cloth, $8.50. Paper, $7.50.

We have here a most scholarly edition of a work which, though of great importance to scholars, had become very difficult to find. The learned editors have not only produced a new edition, but they have given us one which does, indeed, meet modern needs.

The introduction gives a masterful presentation of the author's life, of his works, and of the history of the text. The critical apparatus furnishes us with the readings of 13 MSS, of one fragment, and of the *editio princeps,* 1587. All references, quotations—implicit or explicit—have been carefully identified. All passages which might be in need of explanation are discussed fully, exhaustively, and most learnedly in the exegetical notes. The work is a model of its kind.

The *Vitasfratrum* is of interest not only to the students of religion and of the history of monastic orders but also, and above all, to the cultivated layman. It is a touching and eloquent testimonial to the piety and sincere fervor of men living in an age which we too often associate with Boccaccio and the like. It is a magnificent presentation of the unity of purpose, of the oneness of life, of the spiritual communion and of the joint use of earthly things which held together men of varying aptitudes, different classes, and diverse nationalities in the order and by the rule of St. Augustine.

Since the major effort of the editors consists, it seems to me, in the establishment of the text, it might be of some interest to discuss with

them certain points which may still be *sub judice*. I mean, for instance, that it might be profitable to re-examine such readings as *perambulani* (p. 261), where the editors have not, in my opinion, made the best choice. They needed a word meaning "physician," and have picked from the MSS the above term, which they force into the required sense by invoking a quotation from Seneca. But they had on hand the needed word, *parabolani*, which all through the Middle Ages, both in Latin and in the vernaculars, is commonly used to mean physician. The word in this sense, more or less, is already found in the *Codex Theodosianus* (See Du Cange and other dictionaries). Again, I believe that the reading *diana* (or *dyana*) *stella* given by 5 MSS is preferable to the one here given (p. 196), viz., *quotidiana*. The sense demands an adjective that will contrast "day" with "night," and not a word meaning "daily" in contrast to "weekly" or "monthly." *Stella diana* would correspond to the Plautine *stella diurna*. Of course the adjective *diana*, though common in Italian, is not used normally in the Latin of any period, but our author is not averse to Italianisms and the like, (see *disturbia*, p. 122, and again on p. 123; *balneatum* (*bagnato*), p. 219, *burdaice*, p. 111, etc.) The reading *diana* is, moreover, the *lectio difficilior*. Also, I think that the reading (p. 48) *levitomam* (for the usual *levitonem*) is questionable.

I do not feel certain of the necessity or even of the utility of certain emendations proposed against the authority of all MSS, for example, *modeste* (p. 285) which replaces *moleste*. I believe *moleste* makes very good sense; it modifies *prohibebis*. The rhetorical order is consistent with the general tone of the passage. The meaning of the phrase would then be: "Neither must you, vexatiously, forbid them to eat, nor keep them from fasting."

Likewise the change on page 209 of *immensa admiratione* into *immensam admirationem* seems unnecessary. If we eliminate with 6 MSS the *in* before the said phrase we have a sounder reading, the *admiratio* then being not the goal, but the start. Likewise the change (p. 21, l. 16) of MSS *ut* to *et* does not seem satisfactory. What we need here in place of *ut* is *quod*, a favorite construction of Jordanus (see p. 19, l. 55, and passim).

It would, as I said, be interesting to bring up some of these unsettled questions. But it would require more space than is here available.

The number of misprints is remarkably small for a work of this kind

and of this size. A page of *errata* has been enclosed in each copy. It might perhaps be advisable to print a new list to include twenty or thirty additional typographical errors that have not been corrected in the list above mentioned.

DINO BIGONGIARI

Columbia University

The Commentaries of Pius II, Books II and III. Translation by FLORENCE ALDEN GRAGG with historical introduction and notes by LEONA C. GABEL. Smith College Studies in History, Vol. XXV, Nos. 1-4. October, 1939—July, 1940. Northampton, Mass.

This is the second installment of an English translation of the *Commentaries of Pius II* from the same able hands, Book I having appeared as Volume XXII, Nos. 1-2, of the Smith College Studies in History. It is a fascinating book by the great humanist pope. The text used is again the Vatican Codex Reginensis 1995, as found in the Modern Language Association reproduction in the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. In Italics passages omitted from the Frankfort edition of 1614, the only printed edition, are indicated; notes give the reading of the edition when it differs from the MS, if the meaning might be affected. The translator and the author of the explanatory historical notes have done an admirable job, which is to be continued until all thirteen Books of the work have been published.

These two Books cover the short period from the coronation of Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini as Pius II on September 3, 1458, to the end of the Congress of Mantua in mid-January, 1460, and are chiefly concerned with the long preparations of the Pope for the Congress, the negotiations of Pius with the powers of Italy with a view to a large attendance, and the events of the Congress the purpose of which was the organization of a crusade against the Turks. That is not all, however, for Pius II was a shrewd observer of men, a gifted portrayer of their personalities, appearance, virtues, vices, foibles, one whose caustic tongue in speech is matched by his written words. One who wishes to read quickly and easily sketches of some of the leading personalities of the quattrocento, as disclosed by a ruler who viewed them realistically, will greatly enjoy the book. Scholars familiar with the 1614 edition will find the passages omitted therefrom and here included illuminating

indeed. An interesting essay on these omissions by the present editors and translator would be valuable. How can they resist when the full work has been translated? It is hoped they will not. Many mixed motives lie behind those omissions, and in them lay some of the Pope's most mordant remarks, as witness the page and a half devoted to an audience granted to the royal Portuguese cardinal prince of arrogance, Jaime Cardinal of Sant 'Eustachio ("for the Cardinal was but twenty-three"), an audience which the stripling, "hardly able to get his words out for anger," regretted furiously and bitterly for days until he brought himself to apologize, "overwhelmed with shame at having dared to contend with the Pope." In these same passages are also found evidences of the sly humor of the pontiff, too sly to be admitted into the edition published at Frankfort as coming from the mouth of the Vicar of Christ.

The pageantry, the vices, the diplomatic intrigues of the age appear again and again, and for some hours one lives in an Italy loved and understood broadly speaking, of course, by the Siennese scholarly lover of learning who was difficult to hoodwink, especially by the red-hatted members of his curia. One wonders how quickly they learned the force of the man and ruler after his first year on the throne, when he wrote "No one liked the haughtiness of the cardinals, who, as if they thought themselves gods, condescended to no mortal. The stain of pride, which could be removed only by works of humility, must be wiped out" (one of the many passages in Italics). Was he as a humanist hoodwinked by the address of greeting delivered to him in welcome by the sixteen year old Galeazzo Sforza, ambassador of his father Francesco, or was it policy for the Pope to pretend that "it was astounding to hear the sentiments of an old man issuing from the lips of a lad and to listen to a beardless boy giving utterance to the ideas of a graybeard," and not to note a suspicion that the speech had been written for the occasion by one of the Pope's fellow humanists? Pius at any rate was a trained diplomat who knew when to praise discreetly and when to castigate acridly. He may have been a trifle weak in the history of certain periods and sections of Europe, as the editor points out, but he had few other weaknesses, as his opponents shortly discovered. Perhaps he had a weakness for "fat steers which had been fed on turnips and were used to being washed with warm water, combed every day, and bedded on clean straw," three of which were sent to him at Mantua by Francesco Sforza from Milan;

only one was kept for himself and the cardinals, but "all liked the meat so much that they vowed they had never tasted anything sweeter; *but it was not bought cheaply, for those who brought the oxen were presented with 100 gold ducats.*" If he had that weakness it is surely pardonable and would be even today not frequently indulged. The women of Florence who greeted him in a "marvelous variety of costumes" were not admired for their whitened faces *"clearly betrayed the use of cosmetics."* In assigning third place among the illustrious Florentines to Boccacaio, he "should not go wrong . . . though he was *a little* more frivolous" than Petrarca, "whose equal would be hard to find if his Latin works were comparable to those he wrote in Italian," whereas the first of the trio, Dante, "breathes a wisdom almost divine, though being but mortal, he sometimes erred."

There is a full bibliography and an adequate index in this competent and careful volume of 176 pages.

EUGENE H. BYRNE

Barnard College

The Great Century, in the Americas, Australia and Africa. A.D. 1800-A.D. 1914. Vol. v of *A History of the Expansion of Christianity.* By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943. ix, 526 pp. 7 maps. $4.00.

There are three ways, at least, to write history. One is accurately to state facts, places, and dates. Another is to emphasize the relation of facts to industrial and social developments. A third method is to tell the story around the lives of dominant personalities. Professor Latourette has stuck close to the first method. As a book of reference, where one can follow the date when the Presbyterians, the Roman Catholics, the Seventh Day Adventists, or any other variety of Christian, entered any of the countries under review, or when certain Christian leaders operated in Africa, or Australia, or some lonely Pacific island, the date is here. Whether one is a student in his history classes at Yale, a fellow participant in a conference, or a reader of his numerous writings, Professor Latourette's enormous grasp of church history, and the wide range of his mind over the centuries, never cease to surprise. The extravagant praise given by recognized authorities to the first four volumes of this series are equally applicable to the fifth.

After having discussed, in the first book, *The First Five Centuries,* in the second, *The Thousand Years of Uncertainty,* and in the third, *Three Centuries of Advance,* the author approaches *The Great Century.* He finds the advance of Christianity to have been so great during the nineteenth century that two volumes are necessary. One, already published, is on Europe and the United States. The present one treats of the other Americas (including Canada, the Islands, and Latin America), Australia, New Zealand, the Islands of the Pacific, including the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and Africa (south of the Sahara). This enormous task is accomplished in 560 pages, with a surprisingly good balance of material as well as judgment, concerning Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, small sects and large denominations.

It would seem ungracious to criticize a work which covers a whole century, as does this one, for its omissions. Yet one wonders if much space might not have been gained by the use of modern devices such as graphs, charts, and shaded maps. Too many of such devices would have become objectionable, but some would have saved the repetition of countless verbs on many pages of mere cataloging of the time when the Churches began work in the various fields. For example, the work of the Disciples of Christ gets only one short sentence in fields which that Church regards as of greatest importance, such as the Belgian Congo, the Philippines, Mexico, and South America. The same could be said concerning references to other more modern Protestant Churches. Such information could have been given in a chart or map, even more attractively than in solid paragraphs. More valuable would have been the space saved for dealing with important material which is omitted.

Those who know the author's breadth of vision and sympathies must feel surprise at the almost total absence of reference to the great political, economic, and social movements which went along with the ecclesiastical developments in the fields studied. The nineteenth century was overwhelmingly dominated by the growth of science, transportation, industrialism, social theory, and that which propagated these things as well as Christianity in the countries under review, that is, imperialism. Yet the index does not contain one of these words. At least an introductory chapter, setting forth the enormous influence of European imperialism in the development of Africa, United States industrialism in Hawaii and Mexico, and Dutch domination in parts of

the East Indies—to cite only a few examples—would have made the book a more profound contribution to both history and Christian Missions.

The reading of Professor Latourette's description of the enormous activities of the numerous branches of the Christian Church in spreading the Gospel to so many sections of the world will arouse in the optimist a new faith in the vitality of religion. The pessimist, on the other hand, may be inclined to sympathize with the simple natives of Madagascar, Senegal, Micronesia, or the Gold Coast, who suddenly found it necessary to assure their place in a new heaven by a right selection between the numerous branches of a religion which has such strange differences in dress and doctrine, in songs and signs and services. Unfortunately the author does not relieve this picture by telling about the co-operative movements among the Churches.

SAMUEL GUY INMAN

New York City

A New Witness for Christ in America. By FRANCIS W. KIRKHAM. Independence, Mo.: Zion's Press, 1943, 420 pp. $1.50.

This is a long and rather tedious book about the origin of the Book of Mormon. Its author, a staunch orthodox member of the Mormon faith and the Utah Church, was born into the faith of Mormon parents at Lehi, Utah. He spent several years as a missionary for Mormonism, and many years of his life as a public educator in Utah and elsewhere. This present volume is, as the author indicates in the preface, "a revision and amplification" of an earlier work of his published in 1937 under the title, *Source Material Concerning the Origin of the Book of Mormon.*

The author has divided the book into three main divisions: the first treats of "The Coming Forth of the Book of Mormon"; the second deals with the "translating and printing" of the book; the third, with the exception of the final short chapter of summary and conclusions, is given over to the presenting of non-orthodox anti-Mormon explanations of how the Book of Mormon came into being. Ten such explanations are recorded, but the bulk of attention is given to three of them. The author, of course, rejects all ten, in the main without much or any

conclusive contradictory evidence. To the three main divisions of the book is added an appendix, consisting chiefly of reprints of various early newspaper items: the Anthon letters and the Cowdery letters. Fourteen pages of index at the end of the book make possible easy page location of items and persons mentioned in the text.

The orthodox Mormon account of the origin of the Book of Mormon which the author defends is, for the benefit of readers not already familiar with it, briefly as follows: A "heavenly messenger" named Moroni appeared to Joseph Smith, Jr. and told him of a book written upon golden plates and giving an account of former inhabitants of the Americas. Moroni told Smith that the plates contained "the fullness of the Everlasting Gospel"; that with the plates there were "two stones in silver bows . . . called the Urim and Thummin"; and that God had prepared these stones for the purpose of translating the book. Moroni made three separate and distinct appearances to Smith during that night, and each time word for word said the same things to him. The next day Smith went to the place where Moroni had told him the book of plates was concealed; he dug into the ground and found the book. But when he attempted to take it he was forbidden to do so by the "messenger," who appeared and told him that he was not to receive it until four years later, but that he was to come to the place once each year on that same date. Smith did this and each year met the "messenger" there and "received instruction and intelligence from him at each of our interviews, respecting what the Lord was going to do, and how, and in what manner His kingdom was to be conducted in the last days." At the end of four years, or on September 22, 1827, Smith finally got the book of plates. He took it home and, after numerous frustrations, "translated" it by use of the "two stones." The writings in the book were engravings in "Reformed Egyptian." Smith looked at these engravings through the "Urim and Thummin," and thus the correct English translation became known to him. This "translation" he dictated to a scribe who sat on the opposite side of a curtain and wrote down what he was told. The scribe for practically all of the book was a person named Oliver Cowdery, and the "translating" was all done roughly within a period of seventy-five days. When the "translating" was completed, the messenger Moroni appeared "by arrangement" and took back the gold plates containing the ancient record. Smith, the Mormons maintain, was at the time only an ignorant

unschooled youth, who could not possibly have himself composed the book; that he simply was an instrument in the hand of God for the bringing forth of the "ancient record" containing the "fullness of the Everlasting Gospel."

Dr. Kirkham's central interest in his book is to present "proof" of the truth of the above account regarding the origin of the Book of Mormon; that the Book of Mormon was of "divine origin" and not "man-made." The reader, of course, has to begin by accepting the whole traditional concept of the sharp and distinct division between the natural and the supernatural if the thesis and efforts of the author are even to have any meaning. If one questions or rejects this traditional concept the whole thesis and controversy becomes at once not only useless but silly. The only question that then would remain would be that of whether Smith was a deliberate liar and deceiver, or merely a person given to delusions and hallucinations. The non-Mormon "explanations" of the origin of the Book of Mormon generally proceed on one or the other of these two latter propositions.

Orthodox Mormons feel it essential for their faith to defend the account in all details as Smith himself told it, and officially published it in his autobiographical *History of the Church.* This task has laid an increasing problem upon Mormon apologists as the years have gone by. Pedestrian literalness has been much more a characteristic of the "Mormon Mind" than has poetic imagination. Mormon apologists have, from the earliest days of the church, stressed the piling-up of "legalistic evidences" and "debater proofs" for something that a touch of imagination, or even a sense of humor, quickly would have disclosed to them to be of a nature placing it quite beyond the scope of such "proofs," and securely tenable only as an act of sheer religious faith. Joseph Smith, regarding the origin of the Book of Mormon, talked too much and in too great detail. Additionally, he scurried about and collected "witnesses" who also made detailed "testimonies." A result of this has been that Mormonism, from its very beginning, has been saddled with a detailed story with a content that no scientific non-credulous mind can today accept without a rational "black-out."

Dr. Kirkham's book adds nothing new to this old controversy concerning the origin of the Book of Mormon, not even a new approach. It consists chiefly of reprints of statements, affidavits and testimonies bearing on the controversy, and long familiar to any student of Mor-

monism. There are included a few reprints of materials heretofore not currently available to general readers. Chief of these are the six articles by Obidiah Dogberry from the Palmyra *Reflector* of 1831; brief items from the *Saints Herald* and *Times and Seasons,* and a letter by O. Hyde published in *Plain Facts* in 1841. Nothing is either proved or disproved more than had already earlier been proved or disproved by the same process of "proof," and substantially by use of the same materials. The author, as well as numerous Mormon apologists before him, move too much on the assumption that, if certain testimonies of persons hostile to Mormonism can be shown to be inconclusive or in error, therefore the testimonies of the Mormon witnesses must then be adjudged to have been true. A customary emphasis also is placed by the author upon the alleged fact that none of the eleven "witnesses" to the Book of Mormon ever repudiated their original testimony. But this is proof of nothing except that these "witnesses" may have believed what they testified to. Hundreds of sincere persons have, in times past, given personal testimony of having seen witches and experienced witchcraft, but their testimony constitutes no acceptable proof to the modern mind of the existence of witches.

Perhaps, in some measure, sensing the futility of his "historical data" as an adequate agency of proof, Dr. Kirkham writes in his concluding chapter,

> In this treatise the historical data for the physical events of the "coming forth" and the production of the Book of Mormon have been assembled. Fortunately, one need not rely solely upon these historical data concerning the Book of Mormon. One may see before him today functioning and growing a great church whose hundreds of thousands of members testify that they know the divine origin of the Church not only by historical and physical facts but also by the spiritual power of the Holy Ghost.

So far as the knowledge of this host of present-day Mormons regarding the "divine origin of the Church" rests upon historical and physical fact, it presumably is not more substantial than the knowledge of present-day non-Mormons who have equal access to such "facts." Regarding Mormon "knowledge" arrived at by "the spiritual power of the Holy Ghost," non-Mormons presumably are not privy to that particular source of "knowledge" as it respects Mormonism. But millions of these non-Mormons feel equally confident that "the spiritual

power of the Holy Ghost" has given them assured "knowledge" of the truth of their own particular and various religious dogmas. What the author, as well as like religious apologists, should recognize is that this latter source of knowledge does not give knowledge that, as such, can be presented as objectively valid. It is "proved" valid only to the mind to which it has thus been "revealed." Several million Japanese, for example, presumably have an assured "knowledge," arrived at by what to them would seem to correspond to "the spiritual power of the Holy Ghost," that their emperor is a god. But this "knowledge" of their proves nothing to several hundred million non-Japanese about the Japanese emperor's godship or lack of it.

It is a somewhat curious fact that so many Mormon apologists, including the author of this book, have spent great time and effort in declaring that the Book of Mormon is a "marvelous," "profound," and "divine" book, far beyond the capacity of Joseph Smith or anyone associated with him to write. Yet, these same writers rarely even so much as quote briefly from the Book of Mormon to thus demonstrate its asserted marvelous and profound nature and quality. Seldom has there been so much controversy, so much unqualified praise and unqualified denouncing, regarding a book that itself is so little read or quoted. The fact is that the Book of Mormon is generally quite a tedious, repetitious, and uninspiring book. If one excepts from it the sections copied at length out of the King James version of the English Bible, one will search it quite in vain for any great literary passages, any inspiring or beautiful poetical passages, any "revelations" of significant new truth and insights for man to live by. The Book of Mormon simply can't stand on its own feet as a great, inspiring, or socially penetrating work. It has to be propped-up by a devoted faith in it "marvelous" and "divine" origin. Were it not thus supported and circulated by this faith of Mormon believers, it today probably would not be read by more than a handful of persons interested in curios. It is a long wordy book of some five hundred or more pages in current editions.

Dr. Kirkham makes a point of the fact that the Book of Mormon was "translated" within a period not exceeding seventy-five consecutive days. He uses this comparatively brief production time for a long book as implied proof that it must have been "translated" from a manuscript and not composed by Smith or one of his contempories. Yet, when the problem of the verbatim quotations from the King James version of

the English Bible is raised, the author falls back on the ingenious explanation of Brigham H. Roberts that Smith diligently compared the "translation" of the Nephite record with the English Bible, and where he found that they were alike in thought he "adopted our English translation." But where there are glosses and additions in the Book of Mormon to the quotations, these are explained by Roberts by assuming that when Smith compared his "translation" of the Nephite record with the King James version and "found the sense of the passage of the Nephite plates superior to that of the English version he made such changes as would give a superior sense and clearness." It will be seen that by this "explanation" we have to accept Smith as capable of performing a critical piece of literary work between two translations. Yet, elsewhere we are insistently pointed to the fact that Smith was so unlettered and devoid of any literary ability at the time that he could not even "write or dictate a coherent and well worded letter." These labored explanations for the sake of trying to retain the orthodox account of the origin of the Book of Mormon will probably appear to the objective reader as too thin for serious consideration.

The author has written a text for the "faithful" rather than an objective treatise for the impartial student. This is not a serious criticism of the author, because he quite frankly begins and ends his book as an unwavering apologist. The reader never has any reason to suspect that the author will arrive at any conclusions respecting his thesis other than the orthodox one with which he launches forth. The "faithful" who read this book may feel that it affords them helpful confirmation for their faith, but the reader who may pick up the book looking for new critical light on the origin of the Book of Mormon will necessarily be disappointed.

S. A. Stowater

Rutherford, N. J.

Three Christian Transcendentalists. By Roland Vale Wells. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. x, 230 pp. $2.75.

Ever since Philo and Paul, philosophy in the West has been, *volo nolo,* the handmaid of Christian doctrine and ethics. Indeed, it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise, for they have a common psychogenesis in Man's craving for a rationale of his cosmic importance. The

transcendental philosophy is a salient and timely instance of this collaboration in an age when the individual had become simply one straitly conditioned link amid a myriad other links in the great chain of being. "Rational" argument for the authority of Christian revelation and morality having been outmoded by the Romanticist appeal to feeling, theology was bound to seek a metaphysical basis upon a similarly subjective and strategically elusive postulate. Transcendentalism offered a providential escalator from the low levels of the inductive method and ultilitarian ethics to the *Castello d' Angelo* of "practical reason" (Kant), "spontaneous reason" (Cousin) and "reflective reason" (Coleridge). With an imposing new jargon for the mystifying product of their "psychological analysis," many transcendental philosophers emerged from their reveries as transcendentalist Christian theologians, offering a plausible rationale for (1) the Cambridge Platform (James Marsh); the Thirty-nine Articles *or,* the 1789 Articles (Caleb Sprague Henry); (3) the American Unitarian Association creed (Frederick Henry Hedge).

These men were teachers of philosophy and leading clergymen in institutions controlled by the denominations indicated. Each of the three was responsible for the publication in this country of a notable work of European Transcendentalism, and each work was characteristic of the editor's special brand of transcendentalist philosophy.

Marsh, professor of philosophy at the University of Vermont from 1826 to 1842, published in 1829, with copious editorial comments, Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection.* Caleb Sprague Henry was professor of mental and moral philosophy at New York University from 1838 to 1852, and in 1834 published, with lengthy comments, Cousin's *Elements of Psychology.* Frederick Henry Hedge was professor of ecclesiastical history (1857-1876) and of German literature (1876-1884) at Harvard; in 1849 he edited *Prose Writers of Germany,* and in 1866, *Hours with German Classics.*

The author's presumption is that, since these men were teachers of ability, popularity, and national prominence, and, in the case of Henry and Hedge, editors of important scholarly periodicals, the ways in which they interpreted Transcendentalism and then transmuted their versions into theological apologetic and practical religious duty deserve systematic exposition and criticism. This service he has rendered with admirable fidelity and clarity, considering the misty and amor-

phous nature of the conceptions dealt with. In this connection it is noteworthy that all three men were emphatic in declaring (to use Marsh's words): "No living and practical knowledge can be arrived at simply by speculation . . . the man must become what he knows; he must make his knowledge one with his own being" (p. 28). Being, knowing, feeling, willing must be one. Marsh died too early to be specific about this; but both Henry and Hedge were progressive and even militant advocates of social reforms: the rights of women, justice and dignity for the mechanic and manual worker, humane penal methods, the improvement of lower and higher education, political honesty, and peace. Both men asserted repeatedly that war is opposed to the teachings of Jesus and the whole spirit of the Gospel (Henry, p. 75, Hedge, p. 143). But transcendental perfectionism did not avail to make Christian pacifism a categorial imperative when the Civil War broke!

In addition to its thorough treatment of the three major subjects, the work is rich in peripheral material, such as the analyses of Coleridge's doctrine in the *Aids* and of Cousin's eclecticism; the sketch of Francis Bowen's defense of Locke and the Scottish intuitionism; the appendices of unpublished letters and manuscripts of Marsh and Hedge, in particular. The book thus becomes indispensable to the historians of philosophy in America and to the students of Congregational, Episcopalian, and Unitarian doctrinal development. The main conclusions seem to the reviewer to be sound with the following exception:

No thorough understanding of Christian Transcendentalism in this country can be gained without beginning with Channing, who was the trail-blazer for all who came after. Dr. Wells follows the error of Nicholson (p. 3, footnote) in this respect; Channing's earnest, questing, contemplative spirit was the spectrum for New England of the philosophico-religious stimuli of Europe now generically termed Transcendentalism. It is all in his printed sermon, "Likeness to God," of 1828; moreover, the reviewer is now engaged in transcribing a hitherto unpublished sermon, "The Greatness of the Mind," composed by Channing in 1823, on his return from Europe, where he met Wordsworth and Coleridge and studied eclecticism at firsthand in Paris. This sermon confirms Hedge's estimate of Channing, as quoted by Dr. Wells (p. 114): "Channing was a simple child of the Light, bringing to the truth no prism but a mirror and giving back without color or shade the illumination he received." Such illumination, as old as Plato, Zeno

and Jesus, as recent as Hutcheson, Butler and Richard Price, was transmitted by Channing to a large comity of disciples, quite as distinguished, and by virtue of their pulpit and literary power, far more influential than the three men of this study. Their spirit and work, if appraised without theological bias, refute Dr. Wells' opening sentence: "The deep-seated religious tradition in New England had either settled into a defense of orthodoxy or had moved ahead to merge with moralism." To imply of James Freeman Clarke, to cite but one of Channing's disciples, that he preached "moralism" is indefensible. In yet another respect, Dr. Wells reveals his misunderstanding of the significance of Channing's Christian Transcendentalism: "Hedge especially was one of the most active leaders in transforming the humanitarian Gospel of Channing into a more radical gospel of social reform . . . the rise of the social Gospel began soon after the death of Dr. Hedge" [i.e., after 1880] (p. 139). On the contrary, the rise of the Social Gospel in this country began with the practical Christian Transcendentalism of Channing, Tuckerman, Howe, Dix, Mann, to name but a few of his disciples, and to say nothing of his admirers among the Transcendental Theists, like Parker. It follows that to write of Christian Transcendentalism with Channing virtually ignored is like discussing Franciscanism with St. Francis left out!

CHARLES H. LYTTLE

The Meadville Theological School

How the Church Grows in Brazil: A Study of the Economic and Social Basis of the Evangelical Church in Brazil. By J. MERLE DAVIS. New York and London: International Missionary Council, 1943. 167 pp. $1.50.

The Evangelical Church in the River Plate Republics: A Study of the Economic and Social Basis of the Evangelical Church in Argentina and Uruguay. By J. MERLE DAVIS. New York and London: International Missionary Council, 1943. 119 pp. 75¢

Brazil and the United States are big neighbors. They are succeeding right now in being good neighbors. This book should help. It contains ample information to convince any bishop of the futility of all attempts to raise an insurmountable barrier between the Evangelical neighbors

of his own country and those of the United States. It is the seventh and best of the series of surveys studying the economic and social basis of Evangelical churches, since the author received his commission for this task at the Madras Conference.

Brazil laid a lasting and almost bewitching spell on J. Merle Davis, as it had on Stephan Zweig who proclaimed it the "Land of the Future." He tells us of his discovery of a new species of man and even of a new social order. The opportunity and the task of the Evangelical churches in Brazil is the solving of the problems of adjustment to the land, in a vast country larger than the United States, where there is "too much land for too few people." And those churches are doing this more rapidly than are similar churches in any other part of the world. They appear to be prepared to fit into an accelerating pioneer movement, where nine tenths of the people still have virtually no transportation and only one tenth of the population of 45,000,000 have got farther than 250 miles from the coast.

The people engaged in this task have a rich heritage, coming from both a fusion and an aggregation of the Iberian, African, and Indian races, with other liberal and varied strains added—a people who respond to courtesy and friendship remarkably. But, in the rural areas especially—and Brazil is eighty per cent rural—they are handicapped by poverty, by the latifundium system which has set the mold of social life, and an illiteracy ranging from sixty-five per cent to almost total darkness. Widespread endemic disease is responsible for apathy and inefficiency which stand squarely across the path of progress of man and nation.

The Evangelical churches can play an important part in the rosy future of this potential cradle of a civilization of from one half to three quarters of a billion souls, provided they can make their message and activities life-related, in accord with the comprehensive parish program recommended at Madras, which makes Christ the Lord of all life and would meet the basic needs of the Brazilian masses—health, literacy and livelihood. The field is a large one; only six per cent of the country is waste land, but only one of the remaining ninety-four per cent was under cultivation in 1936. Recent development is however so rapid that all statistics are out of date before they get into print.

The Evangelical church must deal in general with people of a low standard of living, caused by a low earning power. A recent study

showed that the Brazilian worker has to work thirteen hours and twenty-four minutes for the same essential food which the North American buys with two hours and fifteen minutes of labor; six times as long.

Both immigration and migration are destined to play an important part in Brazil. The influx of multitudes of people, many of them of Evangelical origin, will bring additional tasks and opportunities and make necessary a migration department as a united effort of the churches. New communities will be receptive to new ideas.

Where a territory as large as two Californias has only one hospital (most of the states have none) and the doctors are massed in the large cities, leaving ninety-five per cent of the rural population to experience birth and death without benefit of an M.D.; where life is at a subsistence level and almost no middle class has yet developed; here, in this the eighty per cent of Brazil, its rural life, lies the big task of the Evangelical church.

And it is in Brazil that Evangelical churches are having the fastest growth in the world. Here is found the novel phenomenon of rural congregations coming out of the forest to organize urban churches in fast-growing new cities. Itinerating preachers, spending all day in the saddle, are duplicating a similar era of church life and growth in North America.

The Evangelical church in Brazil is a "man's church." The author in all his travels has seen no finer group of churchmen at work than the 110 members of the men's missionary society of the Congregational Church in Campina Grande. This is because Brazil is a man's world, where man's temptations to power, cruelty, selfishness, and lust have wide vogue. Conditions drive men to despair. The women find some solace in the Roman Catholic Church with its saints, charms and confessions. The men, disillusioned and embittered by an ignorant and often morally corrupt priesthood, for the most part hold aloof from the church, but the call of Christ as Saviour from personal sins and as Lord of life comes to them with tremendous power.

The place and importance of emotionalism in the church is still a moot question, but Mr. Davis would seem to suggest utilizing it instead of ignoring or attempting to suppress it. When it is properly channeled it produces great power. The church denominations in Brazil which are growing fastest are those which recognize the emotional inheritance of the people and give it full opportunity for expression. The author's

description of some prayer and testimony meetings which he attended will make the pastor readers eager to learn the secret.

The missionary spirit of the Brazilian churches and their progress toward self-support, under most unfavorable circumstances, inspire great faith in their future. The book tells how this is being done. But neither the churches nor the government have the necessary philosophy or program to meet new conditions. The lack of adjustment to changing conditions of life and a negative and prohibitive attitude towards forms of recreation and new views of life are causing the loss of large numbers of youth.

The growth and prosperity of the churches in the cities of Brazil is a vastly different and amazing story, and it is well told. They are fulfilling a great mission among the people of the growing middle class of the cities. But few have solved entirely the problems of adjustment to the changing urban life of youth and the provision of ample leadership, both lay and pastoral. Here the author recognizes the need for a Y. M. C. A. type of organization and strangely laments the fact that the Association, by requiring other than an Evangelical Church test of active membership, has cut itself off from serving the bulk of the Protestant youth. He thinks that the loss to both the Y. M. C. A. and the Evangelical movement has been very great. There seems to be no account in his bookkeeping system for the far greater gain for the Evangelical movement, broadly interpreted, resulting from Christian service to the entire community and especially to the unchurched youth. It is probable that several questions will be raised by this paragraph on page 122.

With such vast territories calling for courageous expansion, a co-operative and united effort is the sine qua non for the future. "Brazil," concludes Mr. Davis, "presents an opportunity of heroic dimensions to Christ's followers . . . God is speaking to His Church in unmistakable tones as He passes by in this world conflict, and He will not pass by in this way again in our generation."

The second book under review also belongs to the same masterly series of surveys, and the focus of much attention on Argentina in these days makes it a timely book. Its study will promote a better understanding of Argentina and Uruguay and an appreciation of their problems. Their similarity to our country; their position in the temperate

zone; the 97.5 per cent Cacausian stock of their population, with the absence of a color and racial problem; the predominance of urban life; the presence of a powerful and fast-growing middle class, so lacking in most Latin-American countries, are factors making this area one of the most important from the point of view of the Evangelical Church. The chapters on "The Land," "The People," and "The Economic Base," provide the reader with a clearer picture than could be had from the reading of several volumes of the general run of literature dealing with the River Plate.

The landed aristocracy control every condition and activity upon their estates and bitterly oppose the coming of Protestants. Desperately poor peon families eke out an existence. There is no room for a middle class in the existing order of economy. The average estancia has from 7,000 to 12,000 acres, but fifty families hold 75,000 acres or more, and fifteen have a minimum of 250,000 acres each, with one family possessing more than 1,000,000 acres.

The churches suffer from the lack of a many-sided approach to the human needs of the communities they serve, as an important part of the Gospel of Christ. One of the startling conclusions of the author is that in this area in which the Roman Catholic Church is exceedingly powerful the Protestant forces are using the worst possible strategy, the most ineffective tactics, the weakest possible plan of action in undertaking to win the River Plate area for the Kingdom of God.

Albion, Michigan JAY CARLETON FIELD

Theism and Cosmology. By JOHN LAIRD. The First Series of a Course of Gifford Lectures on the General Subject of Metaphysics and Theism, given in the University of Glasgow in 1939. New York: Philosophical Library, 1941. 325 pp. $3.50.

Mind and Deity. By JOHN LAIRD. The Second Series of a Course of Gifford Lectures, given in 1940. New York: Philosophical Library, 1944. 322 pp. $3.50.

These two volumes, though independent and so written as to be capable of being read without reference to one another, form a single whole. They traverse the fields of cosmology, theology, and the connections between the two.

The type of theology in which Professor Laird is interested, like the theology of the enlightenment and of the pagans, is one forged without benefit of revelation or the testimony of religious experience. Since revelation is today suspect, and many would, with Laird, doubt that they had a religious experience, it is a theology of considerable interest to moderns. Yet, if Professor Laird is to be taken as illustrative, there is little that can be done in connection with it. Most of his time is spent with analyzing, criticizing and questioning previous theological and philosophical formulations. Apart from an aside here and there, he has nothing more positive to maintain than the hesitant and brief admission of the possibility of a "pedestrian" kind of pantheism in which a self-sufficient world is quickened by an impersonal "divine" principle.

It would be an error, I think, to take the dependent character of the approach and the meagreness of the result to be a sign of an inherent weakness in "natural theology," a proof that revelation and religious experience not only enrich but are indispenable presuppositions of any possible theology. The fault lies, I think, more with Professor Laird's powers, methods, and perspective. Had the whole been pursued with more system, subtlety, and self-sufficiency, it would have been much more rewarding and persuasive.

Professor Laird writes with clarity and wit, coins many a neat epigram along the way, and faces each issue with sanity, courage, and candor. But he is singularly free of insight. The feeling of guilt, the fact of conscience, the existence of prophets and mystics, and the experience of tragedy, though pertinent and valuable data for any theology, are never taken at their full weight. Admitting that an adequate theism is cosmological, his account is, nevertheless, unsustained by any persistent treatment of the nature of things. The problems he faces are borrowed from the writings of others, there being nothing in the data which he accepts that makes it necessary for him to deal with the questions he does. Yet he never asks himself how it is that theology ever became a problem. The two books are by nature derivative works, forced on almost every issue to deny that there is evidence for a conclusion one way or another.

Though there are a lamentable number of quite feeble criticisms and affirmations, there is a good sound kernel of hard common sense in them all. The author is a realist in epistemology, takes time seriously, and recognizes that the natural world has a place for values, has an

indeterminate future, and contains a multiplicity of beings selective in their interests and activities. It would be surprising, however, to find that his views surprised any one who had spent some time on metaphysical or theological speculation. His books will prove of value only to those students who have been so immersed in traditional literature as to be unaware of the more recent philosophic discussions of the nature of space, time, mind, and value, or of some of the difficulties which moderns have underscored in connection with the proofs of God, his providence, omnipotence and omniscience. It may prove also to be a useful set of notes for a constructive theologian who, in the throes of creation, might be inclined to overlook a pitfall here and there. It holds no riches for one who seeks an understanding of the world or of God, or even for one who is interested either in seeing how far a natural theology can go, or what kind of defense a pantheism can make today.

Each volume begins with a clear synopsis and ends with a good summary. The first rambles through discussions of the cosmological argument, creation, eternity, omnipotence, and teleology, with little focus or direction. One finishes it with the hope that something positive will emerge in the second. But the second, just as wordy and repetitious as the first, makes little advance. It is concerned with criticizing idealism and with the justification for attributing mind, personality, and value to God. The answer is, of course, little or none. One finishes this volume feeling a need for still another, particularly since it ends with the unsupported conclusion that "metaphysics is not itself weak in principle" and "theism is much more plausible than most other metaphysical conclusions." The whole could have ended just as well with a denial that there was any need or warrant for a metaphysics or theology. It is a testimony to the sad truth that good sense and honesty are not equipment enough to sustain a basic inquiry.

Bryn Mawr College PAUL WEISS

The Primacy of Faith. By RICHARD KRONER. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943. ix, 226 pp. $2.50.

During the academic year 1939-1940, Professor Kroner delivered the Gifford Lectures in St. Andrews under the title, "The Boundary Line between Philosophy and Religion." He later developed one central

theme of these lectures in the Bedell Lectures on "The Religious Function of the Imagination" (Yale University Press, 1941), and another in the Hewett Lectures on "How Do We Know God" (Harpers, 1943). In the present volume, which incorporates the Gifford lectures with some additions and omissions, "the problem of faith is in the foreground, but the problems of religious imagination and religious knowledge are discussed. Indeed, *faith, imagination* and *knowledge* are so intimately combined in the spiritual field that it is not easy to distinguish them" (p. viii).

These three volumes, taken together, state and develop a thesis of absolutely first-rate importance for both philosophy and religion—I use the superlative advisedly. This thesis is that the religious imagination is the "faculty" by which man achieves his most profound insights into ultimate reality, that it has its own logic and its own distinctive language, and that it complements and fulfills reason's proper but inevitably frustrated search for a knowledge of God.

The thesis presumes, of course, the very old contrast of faith and reason, revelation and secular knowledge, which distinguishes the Hebraic-Christian from the Greek tradition. What is so new and significant is the author's resolute defense of the imagination as the source of man's most adequate comprehension of the ultimate. Many previous thinkers have touched on this theme—Plato in his use of myth, some of the Church Fathers in their scepticism regarding human reason, Pascal in his doctrine that "the heart has its reasons, which reason does not know," Kant in his accounts of moral faith and of the productive imagination, Hegel, Bergson and Croce in their respective ways. These and many others have protested against the conceptual rationalism which has dominated our whole Western tradition. The poetry of the Bible and all great Christian art, from the Byzantine to Rouault, has exemplified the validity of the author's thesis, and men's religious experiences have confirmed it again and again. But no one, to my knowledge, has ever developed a constructive argument as ambitiously or successfully as has been done by Professor Kroner.

His exposition does, it must be admitted, leave much to be desired. It is very repetitious, and not nearly as clear as it might have been. Though faith, imagination and knowledge are indeed "elements within one and the same living unity," they can and should be examined consecutively and without confusion. The author continually over-

states his case, though he often qualifies an earlier exaggeration on a later page. His accounts of the religious imagination and of religious knowledge in the two small books mentioned above are much clearer than is his treatment of these subjects in *The Primacy of Faith*. The latter attempts too much in too brief compass, and too often substitutes persuasion for careful analysis. Nonetheless, the author has stated the problem of religious knowledge, challenged its traditional "solutions," and developed a new solution in terms of the imagination, with profound insight. He does not pretend to have given us that "new Christian philosophy" or "Protestant philosophy" which he rightly believes we desperately need, but he has started us along the right road and has provided many of the basic concepts requisite to the task. This is itself an achievement of major importance.

The argument is far too rich and complex to permit of adequate summary in a few paragraphs. The opening chapter, on "Biblical and Natural Theology," first contrasts science and religion, then philosophy and religion, and then defends, chiefly against Karl Barth, a natural theology "in the sense of a rational or speculative discipline which is in agreement with Biblical theology" (p. 11). Science and religion have no common ground and are thus not in conflict with one another.

> Whereas science tries to discover the way in which nature operates, religion appeals to the consciousness of the mystery that underlies nature and human life. . . . Science endeavors to diminish the realm of the unknown, religion stresses the fact that there is an unknowable. . . . Their realms are wholly different. Science can never produce images in the religious sense, religion can never produce concepts instrumental in science and theoretical knowledge. Religion cannot supersede scientific investigation, but science also cannot replace religious imagination. A sharp boundary line divides these realms (pp. 3-4).

Philosophy and religion, on the other hand, though radically different in important respects, have between them a "both-man's-land" which arouses perennial quarrels. This disputed territory is theology.

> Philosophy is basically and essentially theoretical. It rests upon logical argumentation and conclusion, it aims at doctrines, theories and systematic, methodical knowledge, while religion is related to life in its wholeness, especially to moral life, to conscience and conduct. . . . Philosophy teaches, religion preaches. . . . Philosophy has no priests, no cult; religion has no logical methods, no sober investigations." Yet "philosophy is concerned with the ultimate meaning

of life and reality; so is religion. . . . Religion proposes to construct its own theology, philosophy does likewise. . . . From different bases they move to a common goal . . . a methodical and logical science of God (pp. 6-7).

As a result, each has something essential to contribute. Barth goes much too far in his wholesale rejection of reason, and in his categorical and dogmatic insistence that our only access to the mystery of God is the word of God Himself, as revealed in the Bible. "Such an attitude is not dictated by faith nor by the word of God, but by lack of philosophical interest and insight" (p. 14). But

philosophy should be warned never to forget that there is an ultimate mystery and that revelation is the form in which this mystery is brought to us in religion. If philosophy acknowledges the legitimacy of revelation and gives up the vain attempt to make itself a substitute for it, the path to reconciliation is opened. For it is the task of philosophy, not of religion, to bring about this reconciliation, since there is a philosophy of religion but not a corresponding department within religion. . . . It must restrict itself . . . draw the line which limits the prerogative of philosophic reflection. . . . Philosophy must —to use an expression of Plato—save the ultimate mystery (pp. 20-21).

In the next two chapters the author examines Kant's critique of natural theology and his doctrine of rational faith. He calls attention to the "astonishing paradox" that it was the Christian church in the Middle Ages which propagated the pagan philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, whereas the succeeding modern epoch, though in many respects more pagan than Christian, developed a philosophy born out of the Christian conscience as rediscovered in Protestantism. "This new philosophic movement reached its summit and found its maturest interpreter in Kant" (p. 25), whose attitude differs sharply from that of the ancient Greeks. The Greeks assumed that "not religion but philosophy opened the path to the knowledge of God" (p. 26). Kant, on the other hand, "defeated speculation in its own stronghold and by its own methods" (p. 27). But Kant used reason only negatively, to make room for faith, and for a purely moral rather than a Christian faith. His critique of natural theology, and particularly of the ontological argument, as he conceived of them, is valid. But he did not destroy speculative theology altogether. "He destroyed a special kind of rational theology, the kind which dealt with God in the same way as science deals with matter and natural powers, as if God were a thing like other

things in space and time" (p. 37). On the other hand, "he did not attain to a just appreciation of faith and revelation, of inspiration and imagination in the religious realm" (p. 45).

In his doctrine of rational faith, Kant agrees with Luther in conceiving of faith as a practical moral relation of man to God, founded on conscience, and of God Himself as the moral Author of the world rather than as a First Cause. But, once again, "Kant is too rationalistic a thinker to descry the function of religious imagination. . . . He takes refuge in the device of a faith that is neither really rational nor a real faith. . . . A postulate has not the true character of faith. Belief, in the religious sense, . . . is a kind of devotion, of confidence, of loyalty, of reverence" (pp. 60-65).

The next three chapters deal with the nature of evil, the mystery of man, and the origin of evil in the will. The inadequacies of the Greek conception of evil as error and the Kantian conception of evil as mere disobedience to the moral law are clearly revealed by the profounder Christian conception of evil as sin. The latter alone does justice to the ultimate mystery of the universe and of man as a being capable of apprehending this mystery. The apprehension at once elevates and humiliates man. It is the source of religious awe and of genuine religious faith. Reason tries to grasp this ultimate mystery with finite concepts and inevitably ends in antinomies and contradictions. Hegel, trying to transcend those antinomies, destroyed and falsified the mystery instead of preserving its character. "He transgressed the boundary line between philosophy and religion and thought it possible to rationalize the divine mystery by making reason mysterious" (p. 106). Similarly reason misconceives of human freedom. Freedom is neither a psychological nor a biological property of man. Will is supernatural, a spiritual requirement. "Man is not really free, he ought to act as a free will" (p. 114). Man is in conflict with himself. He never wills evil because it is evil; he merely wills what is opposed to the good in spite of the fact that it is so opposed. Thus evil is knowing the right way and not choosing it. This is the mystery of evil and of human nature.

> Man sacrifices his freedom by means of his freedom. . . . I deceive myself. I act as my own bitterest enemy. . . . The self cannot reconcile itself. . . . Not the moral will but divine love alone can disentangle this "nest of antinomies". . . . Faith alone can reconcile the self with itself, just because faith transcends the entire sphere of the self and enters the sphere of ultimate unity (pp. 130-32).

It is in this context that Professor Kroner approaches the problem of the religious imagination and its apprehension of God via religious imagery.

> Imagination is an indispensable, integral element of faith. . . . Faith is a devotion to the content of a special and historically specialized imagination. . . . All central ideas in Scripture are imaginative: Creation, Paradise, the Fall and Punishment of Adam and Eve, the Covenant with God, the Land of Promise, and so on. . . . God is a God of faith, not of thought; He appears in the kingdom of imagination, not in the system of categories; He appears on Mount Sinai; in the burning bush, in the still small voice, not in the absolute idea. . . . In this realm the ultimate mystery is master, and imagination its suitable tool—not an arbitrary, not a dreaming, not a merely poetic imagination, but rather an imagination that serves accurately and adequately the high purpose to which it is summoned (pp. 133-37).

The author's discussion of the religious imagination tantalizes the reader by opening up vistas and then failing to explore them. He points out that the imagination "is much nearer to real life than either the senses or the intellect. The senses are confined to the particular instance; the intellect is confined to the general species. Imagination alone grasps the whole from which sensation and intellect abstract their objects. . . . We live within the medium of imagination" (p. 138). He asserts, without really showing, the relation of the imagination to mystical intuition. "An image has the power to present God as a living person; no concept would ever perform this role" (p. 142). Hence the God of religious love and fear is always a God apprehended by means of a "holy image."

> We cannot fear a demonstrated God, we cannot even love him. We cannot believe in him. . . . "To believe" in the religious sense does not mean *less* than "to understand" or "to comprehend" by means of logical thought; on the contrary, it means *more* than that; it means a kind of understanding and comprehension which understands and comprehends the mystical majesty of God (p. 147).

Yet faith is not independent of reason. It moves in the direction set by reason, solves the problems which reason itself raises, and subjects itself to a kind of rational discipline. "True faith differs from superstition precisely in that its imagination is not arbitrary, not willful, not merely poetical as the imagination of all mythological religions is, but *charted and disciplined by the demands of reason itself*" (p. 149).

These and other important characteristics of the imagination are described in general terms and illustrated at some length in a chapter devoted to the imaginative account in Genesis of the origin of evil and man's fall. Professor Kroner does raise some of the critical questions which are bound to suggest themselves to the thoughtful reader—as to whether, for example, images can be "true," and, if so, how their truth can be tested or verified—and he suggests the general lines along which he would answer them. He fails, however, to define and analyze even these problems with anything like systematic rigor, and he leaves untouched other questions of equal importance. To what extent, for example, does his whole theory depend upon a discredited "faculty" psychology? To what extent, and precisely in what ways, do the arts in the several major media constitute the languages of imaginative apprehension and discourse? By reference to what criteria can the religious imagination be distinguished from the merely "mystical" or "poetical?" These are questions which must be answered if the general thesis is to be taken seriously by philosophers and theologians.

I am at a loss to know why, in his extended discussion of Kant, Professor Kroner fails to make use of Kant's brilliant suggestions regarding the productive imagination, particularly in § 49 of the *Critique of Judgment,* where he defines an "aesthetical idea" as "that representation of the imagination which occasions much thought without, however, any definite thought, i.e., any concept being capable of being adequate to it," and as "the counterpart of a rational idea, which conversely is a concept to which no intuition (or representation of the imagination) can be adequate." Coleridge, Ruskin, and more recently I. A. Richards would also be well worth consulting.

Finally, I must protest against the arbitrarily narrow meaning which Professor Kroner, in company with other German philosophers in this country like Professor Tillich, assigns to "objective truth" and "objective knowledge." They limit both to the apprehension of spatio-temporal or physical "objects" and are then compelled to deny the possibility of any objective knowledge of God "since God is no object but a self" (p. 40), and to insist that "the truth of faith, if any there be, cannot be the truth of objective knowledge" (p. 199). They seem to be unaware that "objective" is used in this restricted sense only by dogmatic naturalists, i.e., precisely by those whose position they are most concerned to refute; that they themselves need the English term "objective" as the oppo-

site of "subjective," if they are to defend the concept of imaginative *insight*; and that this latter usage is at least as old and as well established in philosophic English as that which they have unhappily adopted.

Despite these limitations, *The Primacy of Faith* is a book which philosophers and theologians should study with the utmost care. I earnestly hope that Professor Kroner will himself further develop his very important thesis and that others will join him in working out a Christian philosophy which really does justice to the religious imagination.

THEODORE M. GREENE

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Liturgy and Personality. By DIETRICH VON HILDEBRAND. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1943. 218 pp. $2.00.

More and more it is evident in our time that there is a Liturgical Theology, that is, a science of God learned through His self-revelation in Christ and our experience of worship through Christ. There has long been such a body of knowledge, for its beginnings are discerned in the austere doctrines of the Old Testament, especially in Isaiah's grand ideas of the Holy One and his preoccupation with Him. St. John's Gospel is profoundly liturgical in its emphasis, its burden being the transforming of human nature from sinful to saintly by apprehension of and participation in the vision of the most Holy. There has long been this science, but it is especially clear in our day that God is calling men to give it the peculiar stress which our life—religious, political, social—demands. The sense of liturgy is abroad in the world. There is an increasing interest in various and varied liturgical "movements," not alone in Roman Catholicism, where the heritage is vast and the means of revival abundant, but in Anglicanism (itself, from the beginning of its reform, a liturgical as distinct from a purely religio-political or exclusively theological movement), and now, latterly, in nearly all the older Protestant cultures and traditions. Men seem eager to be "at work at worship," and this despite (or is it because of?) the sufferings of this present time.

From this growing desire among Christians everywhere there spring three now easily discernible fruits: an awakening to a Christian social consciousness—a conviction about one world; an awareness of the distressful divisions in the Christian family, with a corresponding zeal for

their healing—a conviction about one Church; and a groping after (in some places a courageous and glad return to) the historic Catholic worship, the full expression of Christian faith and life—a conviction about one Bread, one Body. Thus, there is, on the part of the truest prophets and visionaries, in our day a rededication of thought and prayer and study to this liturgical science, and so there is a making of books on this subject. This, one of the "Golden Measure Books," its author Dietrich von Hildebrand, a German theologian now residing in New York and a member of the Faculty of Philosophy in Fordham University, ranks among the best and most profitable that have appeared, say, within the past twenty years.

When one is asked to review an especially fine book—a book unique as to its content and contribution—he ought, surely, to guard against the temptation to compare it with other, perhaps equally fine, perhaps unique and therefore incomparable books. But here, with *Liturgy and Personality,* it is difficult not to think of another, a classic, and until now incomparable study—Romano Guardini's *The Spirit of the Liturgy.* The two differ, not so much in substance as in form. The latter is shorter by a great deal, is on the whole more engagingly and simply written, is less obviously structural and systematic, and thus perhaps more agreeably read and easily understood by the lay student. Yet the two are similar in that they do for the study of liturgical science what few authors have done or seem capable of doing—they lay hold of the spirit of the Liturgy and present it in convincing and convicting, that is, converting, terms. Each is a compendium of liturgical theology. Each is indispensable to one who would study Christian worship according to the grand and lofty Catholic tradition. Each is distinctive and distinguished in its way. It is, therefore, natural to think of them, if not on one's shelves to place them, side by side.

When the late Baron von Hügel wrote, "The first and central act of religion is *adoration,* sense of God," he was stating in emphatic terms the primary doctrine of this theology of which we are speaking. According to this doctrine, the end of Christian worship is *to render God what is due Him.* This is "the first and great commandment." There is in this affirmation no thought and no suggestion of reward—for God is quite simply, in and of Himself, worshipful in that He alone has true worth-ship. That this is true, quite apart from any consideration of gain accruing to the worshipper, cannot too strenuously be urged. The

Logos is sovereign over the Ethos. Or, as von Hügel would put it, the "is-ness" of religion comes before the "ought-ness." It is the meaning of creation, says our author in his first pages, "to imitate and glorify God, the inconceivably glorious and holy."

Yet there is that "second" commandment deriving from the first. The vision of God, as the young Isaiah learned, demands moral purification, ethical integrity, spiritual wholeness—perfection of personality. "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord" (Hebrews 12:14). Man's ultimate dignity consists in this, that he of the whole created order can *consciously* adore and glorify God, can indeed behold the Lord God "high and lifted up," and by this vision himself be sanctified, that is, renewed in holiness, made fit for God. In this most intimate of all relationships—the "I-thou" communion between the worshipper and God, the lover and the Beloved—God first shows Himself; then man sees and responds; then God enters into man's soul and "forms" him in a progressive likeness to Himself. Thus man, remade, transformed, draws ever nearer his true and final end. So then, "the saint alone," says von Hildebrand, "is capable of authentically praising God," and here he echoes the clearest, purest tones of the Christian gospel.

Only Jesus Christ can truly offer adoration to God. Only He can show forth in wholeness of personality, in the measure of the fulness of his perfect human stature, both the meaning of creation and the ultimate worth and dignity of man. Other men, therefore, if they would serve their true vocation, must be "Christed"—must be "in Christ," must be transformed into the likeness and image of the Christ-man. Men become holy (that is, saints, true, *authentic* worshippers) only as they cease to live and Christ lives in them. This forming of the Christ-man in men is the secondary end of Christian worship. To see God and adore—this is that "first and great commandment"; to mold the worshipping community, to be oneself transformed, into Christ—this is the "second" and "like unto it."

What, then, is personality? When is a man a personality? Personality, as it is understood in this context, is that capacity in persons which makes them aware of and capable of responding consciously to true values. Neither the average man, says the author, nor the "crank" is a personality in this, the Christian sense. Nor is the pathological man, nor, necessarily, the natural genius. To understand personality in the

Christian sense it is required that we distinguish between the "normal" and the "average" man. Thus, against the vulgar error which holds that the ordinary, average, run-of-the-mill type is the normal man, Christianity has always vigorously contended. The Christian doctrine of man affirms that the "normal" man is none other than the "Christed" man, that is, the man who is altogether, essentially, completely, and truly man. This man, be he ignorant or learned, great or simple, endowed with natural talents or conspicuously wanting in these, is a *personality* in the Christian sense. He is "the classical man who is fully capable of perceiving values and responding to them, the free, objective man, unrepressed and uninhibited, in whom the capacity for sacrifice and love is unbroken." A Christian personality, then, is never average, never eccentric, and but rarely and not necessarily a genius.

The secondary end of Christian worship is the transformation of man's nature by incorporation into and possession by Christ. This transformation constitutes man a personality. It is a progression toward the likeness of God, a *becoming perfect* as the heavenly Father is perfect. Little by little, there is supplied what is wanting in our human nature damaged (as it is) by sin and prone to that "sleepless hostility to good," that "fixed resolve to sin," which is its lamentable inheritance. It is this conversion of his nature which makes man at length *altogether man,* that is, *normal.* A Curé d'Ars is more complete, more of a man, and more completely a personality in the Christian sense, than the most complete "purely natural genius."

The Liturgy—and Dr. von Hildebrand is careful to define the limits of his use of the term—the holy Sacrifice of the Mass, the Office, and the administration of the sacraments and sacramentals: these "form" the Christian personality. They make for individuality through and in community, as they show the unity which is in diversity. The Liturgy calls forth from man and trains his capacity for reverence. The man in process of transformation through the Liturgy comes to see what is true worth, learns to distinguish values in their hierarchical order, loves more and more what is worshipful, and becomes more and more like what he worships. The man formed by worship is awake to God, to the world; is "on the alert," vigilant; is open to knowledge of himself. He has a sense of *discretio*—of proportion, of discrimination—with profound reverence for the little but vastly significant influences, the

subtle motions, which govern human life and intercourse. He is never vulgar, never "activist"; he puts a greater value on *being* and *becoming* than on merely *doing*. (This is one of the conspicuous contributions of the book, this eighth chapter. Here the classical virtue of moderation is transposed to its Christian and supernatural key.) He is, in sum, the *classical man,* clothed in the vesture of the God-Man, Christ: the man who imputes the sin in man not to his "fate" nor to his frustration, but to man's abuse of his freedom; he is the man who knows that his true enemy is not himself but Satan. He is altogether man in that he is conscious of his essential dignity and responsive to that Life from which he came, to which he belongs, and to which he looks at the end.

GORDON B. WADHAMS

New York City

BOOK NOTES

The Earliest Gospel. By FREDERICK C. GRANT. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943. 270 pp. $2.50.

The subtitle of this volume describes its content as "studies of the evangelic tradition at its point of crystallization in writing." These studies are diverse in character, quantity, and quality. The first four deal with the question of gospel origins. The content of the others can be most briefly indicated by quoting the titles of the chapters: "Was Mark Written in Aramaic?"; "Jerusalem or Galilee"; "The Theology of Mark"; "Mark's Passion Narrative"; "Was Mark a Pauline Gospel?"; "Was Mark Anti-Semitic?"; "Mark and the Social Gospel."

The longest and most technical of the chapters is the study of Torrey's theory of an original Aramaic Mark. The author rejects Torrey's theory, but expresses appreciation for the illumination of specific passages. Two other chapters ("Jerusalem or Galilee" and "The Theology of Mark") give summary and criticism of works by continental scholars. These three chapters are the least original section of the volume.

It is true to a certain degree that the author is repeating himself in the four chapters devoted to gospel origins. This he pleasantly confesses. Yet these chapters add an up-to-date restatement of the form-criticism method, a statement that is doubly welcome since it comes from one of the best-informed and sanest users of that discipline.

The concluding chapters are rich in insights and constructive suggestions, not only for the interpretation of this gospel but also for the understanding of the historical Jesus. The author's presentation of Jesus' teaching in its relation to Judaism is fresh and convincing. This is true especially of the social ethics of Jesus, which is presented against the full background of Jewish ethical ideas. The book deserves serious attention from both theologians and students of the New Testament.

ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL

The Varieties of New Testament Religion. By ERNEST F. SCOTT. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943. vi, 310 pp. $2.75.

For many years it has been realized that what used to be called "New Testament Theology" never existed; the New Testament presents Christianity under a great variety of forms, which Dr. Scott details with his unsurpassed knowledge and skill. But there is a further question. Does this variety of forms mean that an "original gospel" has undergone various distortions, so that the task of Christianity is to penetrate behind all subsequent accretions and return to primitive simplicity? This solution Dr. Scott rejects; there is no such thing as this "simplicity," primitive or otherwise. Jesus himself could speak to his Jewish hearers only by clothing his message in terms of Judaism, and his

message can be delivered to men of other outlooks only in terms of their own thought; the fact that the New Testament presents Christianity under a great variety of forms means simply that the New Testament presents Christianity truly; it must be presented differently to men of different minds if it is to be presented at all. It is therefore incorrect to speak of the faith of the first church as "Jewish Christianity"; the earliest believers were Christians by conviction and Jews only incidentally; the real Jewish Christianity was a later malformation in which what was incidental became primary. Even to speak of "Paulinism" is a mistake. Paul, in the exigencies of his missionary work, found occasion to use all manner of Hellenistic concepts. But these with him were only peripheral. Even his justification theology is more or less accidental, called forth by the exigencies of a special controversy. What was central with Paul was the original gospel, differing not one whit from the gospel that was similarly central with the earlier missionaries—and with Jesus.

This is not to say, of course, that this gospel is equally central in all the New Testament writings. Apocalyptic Christianity's one-sided emphasis distorted the gospel—and yet apocalyptic in some form is essential in any vital religion. James and the Pastoral Epistles teach a moralism that does not flow directly from the gospel—but their moralism was of immense utility. Hebrews ties up its message too far with philosophical speculation, ritualistic symbolism and traditional authority, setting the pattern for the weaker aspect of western Christianity—but western Christianity has also its strength; symbolism and sacramentalism may tend to materialize the spiritual, but they also spiritualize the material. John tells the story of Jesus in terms of an obsolete theology—but his Gospel can be read and understood without the slightest suspicion that this theology existed.

This common measure of agreement was all that mattered; in comparison the disagreements and even conflicts of opinion on less essential matters were of no consequence. And the same was true regarding the much wider measure of disagreements among the converts; in the formation of a "common Christianity" uniformity was never sought for. It soon became clear, no doubt, that certain of those who professed and called themselves Christians—particularly the more extreme gnostics—had no right to the title and must be excluded from the fellowship, but the tests applied were very elementary and obvious; the development of the "orthodoxy" concept lay far in the future.

And, Dr. Scott argues, the development of this concept was a profound mistake that has wreaked havoc. Such a concept is wholly foreign to the New Testament, the Book to which virtually all Christians appeal as normative. The strength of the gospel message lay in its infinite variety and adaptability, and the same is still true. If it be true that Christianity is a universal religion, it must have a message for all mankind—and so must be apprehended in an endless variety of ways.

Such is Dr. Scott's thesis, which he elaborates both historically and theologically. With the historical argument there will be little disagreement among

serious students, and dissent from occasional details will not affect the argument. Appraisal of the theological conclusions will, of course, depend on the standpoint of the critic.

BURTON SCOTT EASTON

The One Story: The Life of Christ. Arranged from the Four Gospels without omitting any event and without the addition of a single word not found in the Authorized King James Version by MANUEL KOMROFF. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1943. 223 pp. $2.50.

The problem of synthesizing the Four Gospels to make one connected account of the life and teachings of Jesus has always been a real one for the general reader. It has been somewhat complicated, perhaps, by a general feeling that the four books *should* tell exactly the same story, and each be credited with the same authenticity. In this view the discovery of differences in small details between the different gospels has often been confusing.

Manuel Komroff has sought to dispel such confusion by arranging in *The One Story* a Gospel version of the life of Jesus made up of selections taken from all four Gospels, which he has put together in such a way as to make a single chronological narrative without repetitions.

The task involved was manifestly an arduous one, and Mr. Komroff must have been called upon to make many difficult decisions. Should he call the name of the man whom Jesus found "sitting at the receipt of custom" Levi, as Luke does, or Matthew, as Matthew does? Did Jesus ride into Jerusalem on a colt, as Luke says, or on an ass, as Matthew reports? Did the Lord at Gethsemane say to his disciples, "Why sleep ye? Rise and pray, lest ye enter into temptation," as Luke relates the event, or, "What, could ye not watch with me one hour?" as Matthew records it? These, and other similar decisions, are inevitable for anyone who attempts the difficult task which Mr. Komroff set for himself. The differences are not in themselves of great importance, and the editor of *The One Story* has, on the whole, solved them well.

Yet, for the serious student of the New Testament, there are many annoyances in the book. In Mr. Komroff's conscientious eagerness to omit neither any incident of the life story nor any word of Christ, he has so mixed passages from the Gospels, and so rearranged them, that some magnificent passages seem garbled to one who is accustomed to them in their original form. And perhaps the gravest difficulty is the complete omission of John's concept of "the Word," which thus perpetuates the general indifference to the distinct theology of the Gospel of John.

But perhaps it is only fair to judge this book from the point of view of the general reader who is little concerned with theological details. For such a one, here is a most readable and convenient form in which to learn the story of the life of Christ. And, from this point of view, the book is to be heartily commended.

ROBERT O. BALLOU

Soul of Russia. By HELEN ISWOLSKY. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1943. xiii + 200 pp. $2.75.

It is very difficult to write an adequate review of this book, for the author has disarmed the critic in her Foreword by saying: "*Soul of Russia* is a work of love more than a work of scholarship. It is meant to offer a series of meditations on Russia's great religious themes as they were expressed by her famous writers and thinkers, by her saints and heroes. And it is in a spirit of meditation that it has been written"; and again, "We have sought to show the forces in Russia herself which have been tending toward *universality* and the directions taken by the apostles of union (with the Roman Catholic Church) who have left their mark on Russian thought."

With this as her purpose, we cannot blame the author if she overstresses the religious aspects of the Russian character and regards as an untrue manifestation of the Russian religious spirit any such elements as the Chlysty and the Skoptsy (see p. 82) which conflict with the ideal which she holds of her people. The Russian character and the Russian spiritual history are far more complicated than she concedes to be possible, and her efforts to bring into a consistent picture all aspects of life and even to seek the Christian values and influence in the rise of the atheistic intelligentsia almost make us believe that she is ready to accept as holy anything which has the Russian name attached to it.

At the same time, she has furnished an excellent amount of material on many relatively neglected episodes in Russian religious life, and in general she is more accurate and interesting the nearer she approaches actual religious feelings and institutions. Her picture of St. Joseph Volokolamsky and Nilus of Sorsk, for example, is on the whole very satisfactory, and so is her discussion of the Third Rome, a development of Russian thought that is all too often overlooked. On the other hand, she quite naturally underestimates the influence of Byzantium and the influence of the Byzantine Church, as well as ignoring the influence of the Balkan Orthodox countries which were instrumental in preparing those translations of the Greek books into Church Slavonic which were brought into Russia at the time of its Christianization, and played an important part in the rise of that Russian nationalism which caused the Raskol.

At times her picture of the Russian authors of the nineteenth century is remarkably clear and understanding. Thus, in the picture of Tolstoy she sees clearly that his fundamental difficulty lay in his blindness to the supernatural, and to the fact that "the redemption of man, however high his aims, must be the work of grace" (p. 148).

It is unfortunate that along with these great virtues, there are some errors which could be easily corrected: she confuses John III, often called Ivan the Great, and John IV, the wellknown Ivan the Terrible (p. 32) (it was the first of these who preceded Vassily and not the second); and there are several other mistakes of this kind. In addition to that, she has adopted no standard form of transliteration and writes Wladimir and St. Alexander Nevsky, Pojarsky, and Jaropolk (where the letter j represents two distinct systems of pronunciation, standing respectively for zh and for y).

Yet these are relatively minor defects, and even those who do not accept the author's views on the supremely Christian character of the Russian people and their attitude toward the Roman Catholic Church can still read the book with pleasure and profit, for she has given sympathetic and intelligent pictures of many of the Russian saints and of the most important events in Russian religious history. She has touched subjects that are usually passed over and which are of vital importance for the understanding of Russia, and we can only welcome the work as a valuable addition to the literature on Russia in English.

C. A. M.

John Amos Comenius, That Incomparable Moravian. By MATTHEW SPINKA. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1943. ix, 177 pp. $2.00.

We must be very grateful to Professor Spinka for publishing this biography of John Amos Comenius in connection with the three hundred and fiftieth anniversary of his birth. Comenius was a remarkable figure in the seventeenth century and a tragic example of the dislocations occasioned by the religious struggles, the Thirty Years War and the subjugation of Bohemia and Moravia to the Hapsburgs. Yet his misfortunes did not break him, and, amid his many cares and trials, he was able to undertake a reform of education in many countries of Europe and to work out ideals of universal knowledge and of universal reconciliation which the world has not yet reached in its process of development. In this volume we have a careful study of the different fields in which his genius worked, and we can appreciate even his lapses into the ideology of his century and his strange aberrations in the field of the acceptance of prophecy. It is not too much to say that Comenius the idealist, seeking at times to dabble for his country's benefit in the politics of the day, showed himself unprepared to act with reason and intelligence on the plane where lesser men were able to move with relative ease. It was in the fields of pedagogy, ecumenicity and pansophism that he was the master, and it is quite natural that his actual accomplishments as a bishop of the Unity fall short of the ideals that he held out to contemporary thinkers and idealists.

In his views of missionary work, it is interesting that Comenius, advocating the unifying of Christianity, thought of Islam and the heathen nations of the world as easier problems than the bringing of the Jews into the mercy of God (cf. p. 83). Like many men of his time, he was far more conscious of the Turkish and Islamic problem, when the Turks were soon to threaten Vienna, than are the modern thinkers for whom Mohammedanism is strictly a foreign problem with little direct contact with Europe and America.

It was only natural that Comenius should be very bitter in his attitude towards the Roman Catholic Church, the representatives of which had forced him from his beloved Moravia and had brought upon his people most of their hardships. Yet without being untrue to the Protestant tradition, Comenius seems to have acquired a kinder judgment of many aspects of that Church, and

his correspondence with Mersenne and some other Roman Catholic thinkers shows clearly that he had come to regard them as part of the human race that was to be benefited by his beneficent ideals. It is unfortunate, therefore, that in the historical background of the life and times of Comenius, the author has seen fit to mention only the dark sides of the Counter-Reformation, which certainly profited by the internecine strife of the Protestant groups.

Yet this is but a minor defect, and, in his main theme, the development of John Amos Comenius and his ideas, Professor Spinka has given us an excellent and much needed picture of a man who adorned every field which he seriously touched and whose influence and ideas still need to be considered in almost every phase of humane letters.

C. A. M.

Religion and Empire: The Alliance between Piety and Commerce in English Expansion, 1558-1625. By Louis B. Wright. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1943. viii, 190 pp. $2.00.

The policy of toleration finally enabled the English people to accommodate themselves, their polity and their economy, to the irretrievable disruption of the historic church, but with the result that organized religion among them came to reflect not the union of all men under God but the differences which had sprung up within the English nation. These differences, since the seventeenth century, have loomed so large that we have tended to assume that already in the sixteenth century every little English child that was born alive must have been born a little Anglican or else a Puritan. But before the English became divided into Anglican and Puritan, Church and Dissent, they became addicted as a people to the perfervid reading of the Bible, to doctrines and beliefs which derived, with varying dependence upon Augustine and Calvin, from Paul, and to attendance upon sermons in which these conceptions were set forth. The seeds of future differences were present, but only in the midst of a prevailing form of Christian piety which, before the great cleavages of the seventeenth century, served to render Englishmen as much at one in spirit as later they became at odds. To understand this common element in English religious life is at least as important for the student of history as to identify the divisions, and their repercussions, into which English Protestantism soon resolved itself.

Mr. Wright, in his previous writings, has taken a major part in making us realize this fact and its importance in the cultural history both of the English and ourselves. In the present volume, consisting of lectures delivered at the University of Washington in 1942, he shows in abundant and lively detail, and with the animation to which he has accustomed his readers, how common English Protestant piety was called upon to fortify the spirits of voyagers, explorers, traders, freebooters, colonizers, and investors in England's heroic age. The merchant companies, when they sought to instill the confidence they needed

to arouse, if they were to raise the capital required for their adventures overseas, turned naturally to the scriptures and called in the preachers to expound the word of God suitably to the occasion. Hawkins, Drake, and the rest did not sally forth upon the perilous seas without the same comforts. Zeal for converting the heathen was a motive freely alleged for the religious accompaniments of the enterprises of these men, but a more compelling motive was the need of the men themselves, both the voyagers and their backers, for those reassurances of the spirit to which Englishmen were committed and accustomed. They had to carry the book with them everywhere, and if possible a minister of the word, in order to assure themselves that God was with them, that none, therefore, could stand against them, that the ultimate success of their enterprise was predestined. This is simply to say that the religion of Englishmen, in that age, made English enterprise viable, as imaginative faith of some sort—Mr. Wright reminds us—must always be at hand if ideals and institutions are to live. It was no accident that Hakluyt, the great chronicler of the English voyages, was a preacher. One remembers, reading Mr. Wright's delightful and illuminating book, how Robinson Crusoe was saved from despair upon turning up the Bible he had brought ashore from the wreck.

WILLIAM HALLER

The War Against God. Edited by CARL CARMER. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1943. xiv, 261 pp. $2.75.

"It is so much easier to attack war than to attack the evils in human life that produce war, . . . an attack on war is the sheerest uncritical sentimentality." These words, borrowed from the last of the forty-three contributions to this collective book, may give the reader an idea of the admirable plan the editor had in mind. It is another question, of course, how far he has succeeded in realizing his purpose by means of this motley assortment of pieces. Almost all of them have been published in magazines, only about four being new.

The book might be called a sort of premature textbook of the anti-totalitarian crusade, but it is of value rather as a guide to this generation in its conquest of totalitarianism. Besides a small portion offering some of the characteristic utterances of Nazi leaders, and some from that part of German resistance stemming from Niemöller and the Catholic bishops, it contains statements concerning the religious implications of war. Among these statements, which are of very divergent value, the following are outstanding: "Warning to Daydreamers," by Robert Bellaire; "The Continuing Pacifist Menace," by Henry Sloane Coffin; "The Power of the Church," by Sir Stafford Cripps; "We Fight for Peace," by Henry W. Hobson; and Lynn Harold Hough's "Sword of God," whose readiness "to be unsheathed is the only safety of the world."

KARL E. BETH

Signs of Promise (The Mendenhall Lectures, 1942). By FRANK S. HICKMAN. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943. 186 pp. $1.50.

The purpose of this book by the Professor of Preaching and Dean of the Chapel at Duke University seems to be to offer Methodist preachers an intelligent restatement of some central evangelical convictions. The first chapter provides a summary, which many will doubtless be glad to have available, of Professor Sorokin's sociological study, *The Crisis of Our Age;* Dr. Hickman points to religion as meeting the need for a basis more than the "sensate" or the merely rational for the life of society. His own interpretation of religion appears in the following chapters, which trace the power of the spirit in the nature of man, the order and course of history, and the life of the Church as the Body of Christ. The theologian cannot credit Dr. Hickman with either clarity or depth. Typical aspects of his writing are the constant relapse into summary of the ideas of books (biblical or current) instead of facing the ideas themselves, and the frequent use without definition of the very ambiguous word "spiritual." The preaching of Dr. Hickman and those who learn from him is probably earnest and good rather than great and profound; it is too often, one fears, not only a word to man but a word about man—Hickman seems to feel uneasily that the mystics and the Barthians have in their different ways got hold of something important, but he doesn't quite grasp it himself and is sure that the common man won't like it. But such criticisms are perhaps captious. What one finds in *Signs of Promise* is a treatment of the problems of life as the average American sees them, with the historic faith brought to bear upon them by a preacher who has the advantage of sharing much of the average man's outlook himself. God does not save us by great men alone, but by great ideas as assimiliated by the common man. Dr. Hickman's book both is an example of this important process and will be a means of carrying it on.

E. R. HARDY, JR.

Religion, Science, and Society in the Modern World. By Alexander D. Lindsay. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943. vi, 73 pp. $1.50.

This little book contains the three Terry Lectures delivered by the Master of Balliol, at Yale University, in 1942. The titles of the individual lectures are "Religion and Freedom," "Science and Freedom," "Power and Freedom." Professor Lindsay presents certain problems of democratic society with sureness of experience and moral sensitivity. His suggestions as to procedure for their resolution show a generous spirit, but remain rather vague and inadequate.

The author starts from the care for freedom of worship and freedom of thought in Anglo-American traditions. The core of his argument is that present experience shows the impossibility of maintaining free churches and free universities except as integral parts of a social community once more freed from the grave disorders to which ours has fallen subject. Among the disorders

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Professor Lindsay specifically mentions are the state of mind of the young unemployed everywhere before the war, the isolation and dry rot of the churches and universities, the growth of new and alarming forms of economic power which "it became evident . . . had far more influence over what was happening than either religion or science. . . . In a world which wanted, above all, the scientific mind in the service of the merciful heart, the merciful heart became sentimental and the scientific mind indifferent" (p. 62).

We must learn "to use power to make ourselves free, not just to defend an existing freedom," Professor Lindsay says. "The great adventure *is* at an end unless we can re-create the conditions which first made it possible, can heal the divisions in our industrial society, break down the walls of misunderstanding which divide us, and regain that unity of spirit which makes freedom possible" (p. 59). That unity of spirit must, of course, include respect for differences. Professor Lindsay refers at this point to the delicate knowledge of the mind and its possibilities, and to the "reverence for the otherness of other people" which the mental healer has to have, "if he is to use his power to make men free" (p. 68). He also calls Kierkegaard, Socrates, and the Gospels to witness that the very highest power lies in the art of using power to make men free.

In dealing with problems of evaluation and intellectual method, Professor Lindsay turns somewhat aside from the physical and social sciences, and approves the emphasis of Wilhelm Dilthey upon that process of "re-creative imagination" whereby poets and artists preserve for us the significance of the vital historical experiences we have lived through *(erlebt)*. "By this instrument of Erleben or imaginative sympathy," he protests, "I do not mean intuition or instinct or any kind of vague hunch. Poetry and art are highly creative and rational activities" (p. 48). Nevertheless, by the position he takes on this matter of method, Professor Lindsay seems to continue the separation of art and science, and to confirm the very isolation of science which, he points out, has exhibited such destructive potentialities. He seems to leave science in the position of a technical servant, without recognizing that its procedures of inquiry and testing can play an integral part, when joined with artistic and moral imagination, in the functions of evaluation and guidance. His summons to a community with a regained unity of spirit that makes freedom possible has, therefore, a fuller import than does his pointing of the way.

H. L. F.

Coronal. By PAUL CLAUDEL. Rendered into English by SISTER MARY DAVID. New York: Pantheon Books, 1943. 257 pp. $2.75.

The principle of the poetry of Claudel is in a kind of thirst and hunger, not for any particular food or drink, but for the world in its totality as something to be drunk and consumed:

> "We have not too much, far from it, in the sky, of those abysses illimited, from which we hear that the Earth—first line of the book—was separated."

(Not at all as the translator says:

"As the stars are scant in the Heaven of all those limitless spaces
Of which when they parted from Earth, the book in its history traces.")

In the *Hymn of Epiphany,* Claudel represents Jesus himself as athirst and hungry for everything. But He is, at the same time, the God who calms this thirst and this hunger. What Christianity (in its Catholic form) has given to Claudel is this sense of participation of Jesus in everything and of everything in Jesus, the reciprocal fulfillment, the atonement.

"Not a drop of the ocean into which He does not enter, nor which is not necessary to Him."

(Not, as says the translator:

"Not a drop of the ocean exists untouched by His charity.")

So, although the feeling of Sin is present, and the necessity of the Sacrifice is stressed, although Jesus, the Immense (and the thought of the Immense is very strongly present in Claudel's poetry), is also the powerless God on the Cross, what strikes us most here is the final result—the redemption, achieved by the super-abundant Grace. Everything is redeemed: the body, the earth; the material is sublimated into a symbol, more than a symbol, of the spiritual.

All this is another manner of saying that the idea of the Incarnation dominates the whole conception of Claudel. Jesus magnifies and sanctifies the whole world, which is His manifestation. Here we may borrow one line from the translation (sometimes there are happy renderings):

"To its edge, the illegible book of the sky lies open with resistless evidence."

The earth is seen in its baptismal robe, and man as just being made by God:

"I am constituted and sealed by God," says—or, rather, shouts—Claudel; "man must know his *énorme apanage*" (poorly translated by "fair hope").

It is difficult to give an idea of all the diversity mixed with the grandiose monotones of the book: dramatic chiaroscuros, familiar scenes, and *tableaux d'interieur,* magnificent descriptions of extreme winter, extreme summer, and poignant spring—all this is rolled up in these poems. Sometimes we perceive half-hushed words, undertones between silence and silence; more often it is the thundering voice under the high arch of a cathedral sky that we hear with its beautiful Latin words, while images worthy of Homer or the Bible or Dante shine before our astonished modern eyes.

At some moments this poetry reminds us of Coventry Patmore, Francis Thompson—whom Claudel knows; sometimes of G. M. Hopkins—whom perhaps he does not know; more often even of a poet like Crashaw. But none of the religious poets is more deeply moving nor, indeed, more magnificently rhetorical than Claudel, in some of his lines. He ranks among the greatest of the religious poets.

In accordance with its usual commendable custom, the Pantheon Press prints the French text and the English translation together, on facing pages, so that the reader may refer from one to the other easily.

JEAN WAHL

A Guide for Church School Teachers. By RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER. Louisville, Ky.: Cloister Press, 1943. ix + 125 pp. $1.25.

In this small volume Professor Miller, of the Church Divinity School of the Pacific, has compressed an immense amount of useful material on the reconstruction of religious education in local churches. He has produced a handbook which will be found valuable for ministers and teachers and interested lay people. Although he writes primarily for workers in the Episcopal Church, most of his suggestions are quite as pertinent for other Churches. Chapters are included on the history and purposes of Christian education, characteristics of various age groups, methods of teaching, church school curriculum, worship for children, recommended lesson materials, and a list of books for a Church School Library.

The point of view from which the book is written is that of liberal Christianity, unmodified by recent theological trends. Religion seems to be defined as certain human attitudes and action rather than as God's action and man's response to it. A strong plea is made for "life-centered" methods in teaching religion. Practical as it is and useful in many ways, the book raises as many problems as it answers. Chief among these problems in the mind of this reviewer are these: What is the true nature of the Christian religion seen in relation to the developing capacities of American children of today? and, Must one be a liberal Christian according to Professor Miller's definition in order to make full use of the insights of educational psychology?

ADELAIDE CASE

The Art of Preaching. By ARTHUR ALLEN. New York: Philosophical Library, 1943. 93 pp. $1.75.

Preaching the Word of God. By MORGAN PHELPS NOYES. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943. ix, 219 pp. $2.00.

The Creative Delivery of Sermons. By ROBERT WHITE KIRKPATRICK. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. xxii, 235 pp. $2.50.

The first of these books, by an English clergyman, contains a Foreword by Charles S. Macfarland, praising the little manual for going to the heart of preaching, which "is the preacher himself." The second book, by the minister in the Central Presbyterian Church, Montclair, N. J., consists of the Sixty-Sixth Series of Lyman Beecher Lectures on Preaching, at Yale University. It is more concerned with the content of the sermon than the techniques of delivery, and is highly recommended by Henry Sloane Coffin. The third book, also by a

Presbyterian minister, contains a Foreword by Ralph W. Sockman, commending especially the author's emphasis on the need for emotional power as well as good techniques of delivery. All three books are intensely practical, but not superficial.

We Thought We Heard the Angels Sing. By LIEUTENANT JAMES C. WHITTAKER. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1943. 139 pp. $1.50.

A thrilling account of the spiritual adventures of men faced with death for twenty-one days, on a raft in the Pacific—Eddie Rickenbacker's heroic men. In the face of this firsthand account of religious conversion, much that is written these days on the subject of religion seems tawdry and secondhand.

The Glory of God. By GEORGIA HARKNESS. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943. 125 pp. $1.00.

A collection of fifty poems and fifty prayers for devotional use by the gifted Professor of Applied Theology at the Garrett Biblical Institute, of uniformly high quality, which should prove useful to many in our troubled times.

The Pattern Life. By F. HOMER CURTISS. Washington, D. C.: The Curtiss Philosophic Book Co., 1943. xii, 285 pp. $2.50.

A symbolical and mystical interpretation of the life of Jesus as one of a series of periodic manifestations of "The Universal Solar Myth," each event of his earthly life representing the Sun in one of the twelve signs of the zodiac,—written to confound the literalists, Fundamentalists and Higher Critics alike.

Supreme Court of the United States. October Term, 1942. No. 591: The West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Walter Barnette, Paul Stull, and Lucy McClure. 26 pp.

Brief filed by the Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar Association, as friends of the Court, in connection with the case concerning compulsory flag salute by public school children. "Conclusion: The compulsory flag salute as applied to these plaintiffs and their children should be held to be an invalid deprivation of religious liberty."

Europe in Transition. By ALEXANDER MCLEISH. Part I: *The Churches Face the Future.* Part II: *Churches Under Trial.* (War-Time Survey Series, Nos. 5 and 6) London: World Dominion Press, 1943. No. 5, 38 pp. 40¢; No. 6, 48 pp., 50¢.

Should the Churches Plan for Peace? National Opinion Research Center, University of Denver. Report No. 10. July, 1943.

"Summary: Two out of three Americans (63%) believe that planning for peace is a legitimate function of the church."

The Christian Requisite for Peace. By NICHOLAS VINNER. Privately printed, New York, 1943. 24 pp.

A plea to the Roman Catholic Church to renounce its claim to supremacy, based on the forged Donation of Constantine, and heal the schisms which rend the Mystical Body of Christ, and make lasting peace in the world an impossibility.

Beyond Agnosticism. By BERNARD IDDINGS BELL. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1943. 170 pp. $1.50.

A Fifth Edition of Dr. Bell's popular "Book for Tired Mechanists," which is based on the author's own pilgrimage from Fundamentalism through agnosticism to Anglo-Catholicism. The book should be useful to many on the same pilgrimage from doubt to faith.

Anchors to Windward. By STEWART EDWARD WHITE. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1943. 191 pp. $2.00.

A well-known novelist makes his contribution to wartime literature by offering his own method of achieving "the four freedoms of the spirit," which are "stability, serenity, eagerness, and unfoldment." His method consists mainly of tuning in on the All-Consciousness, during regular meditation periods, in order "to open the channel of ourselves to the flow-through from the Source." It all sounds a bit "newthoughtish," but tempered by an altogether ingratiating common-sense, tolerance, and humor.

Tales of Tokuzan. By W. J. GABB.

Beyond the Intellect. By W. J. GABB.

The Way of Becoming. By CLARE CAMERON.

Buddhism and God. By R. J. JACKSON.

A group of small booklets on various Buddhist subjects, published by The Buddhist Society, 106, Great Russell St., London, W.C. 1. 9*d* each.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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The Gilgit Manuscripts of Buddhism. By Bhikshu Brahmabodhi. *Prabuddha Bharata,* XLIX (1944), 47-53; 86-90.

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Buddhism and the Cultivation of Beauty. By O. C. Gangoly. *Aryan Path,* XV (1944), 8-13.

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Srimad Rajchandra—The Great Jain. By Popatlal P. Shah. *Vedanta Kesari,* XXX (1944), 281-85.

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Hinduism Abroad. By The Editor. *Prabuddha Bharata,* XLIX (1944), 146-53.

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Sculpture representing 'Mother and Child.' By U. C. Bhattacharya. *Prabuddha Bharata,* XLIX (1944), 84-86.

A Pilgrimage to the Sacred Cave of Amaranth. By Swami Jagadiswarananda. *Vedanta Kesari,* XXX (1944), 275-80.

The Icy Home of the Ganges. By Swami Apurvananda. *Prabuddha Bharata,* XLIX (1944), 25-34; 78-83; 134-38.

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